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Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and
Commercial Impracticability
Leon E. Trakman*
The increasing invocation of the doctrine of commercial
impracticability as an excuse for contract breach raises varied
and complex problems of loss allocation. Trained in the formal
application of legal doctrine, common law judges historically
have refused to spread the burden of a contract discharged be-
cause its performance has been rendered commercially imprac-
ticable. Notwithstanding the theoretical availability of a broad
array of loss-sharing remedies incorporated in the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, and the Uniform Commercial Code,2 ju-
dicial adjustment of losses, until very recently, has been the ex-
ception, not the rule. Courts are increasingly recognizing,
however, that in a commercial environment in which absolute
liability for losses is both uneconomical and the source of indi-
vidual hardship, loss allocation provides a plausible means of
commercially wise and equitable accommodation.3 Yet, despite
the historical application of loss splitting by admiralty courts,
no consistent methodology has developed to allocate losses in
cases of commercial impracticability.
This Article traces the evolution of the doctrine of com-
mercial impracticability from its beginnings as a rare all-or-
nothing remedy to its present status as an embryonic loss-shar-
ing doctrine. It then proposes a methodology for the incorpora-
* Professor of Law, Dalhousie Law School, Canada.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACS §§ 261-72 (1981).
2. See U.C.C. § 2-615 (1978). All references to the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) are to the 1978 Official Text and Comments, unless otherwise
indicated.
3. This is particularly so in relation to long-term contracts in which both
parties have reason to continue their relationship despite the intervening dis-
ruption. To insist on performance without relief or to excuse performance
completely by law may undermine the continuity of the parties' relationship.
Cf Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments under Long-Term Supply Con-
tracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 369, 372-75 (1981) (suggesting that long-term contracts
should be more readily adjusted). But see Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frus-
trated Contacts: The United States, 64 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1984) (courts should not
adjust performance obligations under long-term contracts).
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tion of loss-sharing concepts into the doctrine of commercial
impracticability. The proposed methodology presents two dis-
tinct means of effectuating adjustment of losses in cases of com-
mercial impracticability. The first alternative places primary
responsibility for loss allocation on the parties themselves, rec-
ognizing the advantages to be gained by judicial facilitation of
out-of-court settlement. In those cases in which private settle-
ment cannot be reached, the second proposal considers several
methods by which courts may uniformly allocate performance
losses. Together, these two alternatives provide a uniform
framework for the incorporation of loss-sharing principles
within the doctrine of commercial impracticability.
I. COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY:
AN EVOLUTION
For centuries the common law system concentrated on the
narrow substantive law of impossibility without considering the
availability of a remedial regime of adjustments.4 Courts
4. See Anderson, Frustration of Contract-A Rejected Doctrine, 3 DE
PAUL L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1953); Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light
of Contract Practices in International Trade, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1414
(1963); Conlen, Intervening Impossibility of Performance as Affecting the Ob-
ligation of Contracts, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 37-39 (1918); Corbin, Frustration of
Contract in the United States of America, 29 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 1
(1947); Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
860, 862-64 (1968); Gow, Some Observations on Frustration, 3 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 291, 293 (1953); Hurst, Freedom of Contract in an Unstable Economy: Ju-
dicial Reallocation of Contractual Risks under UC.C. 2-615, 54 N.C.L. REV.
545, 549 (1976); Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 903, 904 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Patterson, Conditions]; Patterson,
The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L.
REV. 335, 348-55 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Patterson, Apportionment]; Schle-
gel, Of Nuts, and Ships, and Sealing Wax, Suez, and Frustrating Things-the
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 23 RUTGERs L. REV. 419, 419-29
(1969); Smit, Frustration of Contract: A Comparative Attempt at Consolida-
tion, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 287, 288 (1958); Trakman, Legal Fictions and Frus-
trated Contracts, 46 MOD. L. REV. 39, 43 (1983); Vogel, Impossibility of
Performance-A Closer Look, 9 PuB. CONT. L.J. 110, 111-13 (1977); Wade, The
Principle of Impossibility in Contract, 56 LAW Q. REV. 519, 520-21 (1940); Web-
ber, Frustration of Contract, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 283, 285 (1951); Wood-
ward, Impossibility of Performance as an Excuse for Breach of Contract, 1
COLUM. L. REV. 529, 530 (1901); Note, The Economic Implications of the Doc-
trine of Impossibility, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 1251, 1253 (1975); Comment, Contracts:
Excuse of Performance by Existence of Condition Causing Unforeseen Ex-
pense, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 408-09 (1916); Comment, Supervening Impossibil-
ity of Performance as a Defense, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 322, 323 (1936);
Comment, Contract-Impracticability of Performance as an Excuse for Breach
of Contract, 46 MICH. L. REV. 224, 225-27 (1947).
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mechanically applied the general substantive rule that an obli-
gation assumed without condition binds the promisor.5 Gradu-
ally, however, courts began to qualify the rigid principle that
bound the parties unconditionally to the consequences of risks
assumed by contract and developed a formidable body of non-
performance doctrine, referred to variously, but not exhaus-
tively, as impossibility,6 frustration,7 force majeure,S or
5. This proposition can be traced back to the early English case of
Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, [1647] 82 E.R. 897, 898, and, in the United States, to
Stees v. Leonard, 20 Minn. 448 (1874). In Stees, Judge Young stated-
The general principle of law which underlies this case is well estab-
lished. If a man bind himself, by a positive, express contract, to do an
act in itself possible, he must perform his engagement, unless pre-
vented by the act of God, the law, or the other party to the con-
tract. ... This doctrine may sometimes seem to bear heavily upon
contractors; but, in such cases, the hardship is attributable, not to the
law, but to the contractor himself, who has improvidently assumed an
absolute, when he might have undertaken only a qualified, liability.
The law does no more than enforce the contract as the parties them-
selves have made it.
Id. at 451. The notion that risks are "assumed" by promisors is reflected in
recent case law as well. In Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
508 F.2d 283, 294 (7th Cir. 1974), for example, the court stated, "We will not
allow a party to a contract to escape a bad bargain merely because it is burden-
some." See also Publicker Indus. v. Union Carbide Corp., 177 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 989, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (parties intended risk of price in-
crease would be borne by the seller); Trans-State Investments, Inc. v. Deive,
262 A.2d 119, 121 (D.C. 1970) (defendant assumed the risk of inability to per-
form); RSTATItMNT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 268(2) (1981) (frustration ex-
cuse not applicable if party has assumed risk).
6. The term "impossibility" has traditionally been employed to deter-
mine circumstances in which an obligation should be excused. The problem
lies in determining precisely what "impossibility" means-"physical" or
"legal," "objective" or "subjective," "complete" or "partial." Each of these ad-
jectives is used to qualify the ambit of an "impossibility" in law; but not all
forms of "impossibility" lead to an excuse from performance. "Subjective,"
unlike "objective," impossibility does not relieve a promisor from assumed ob-
ligations. A promisor who cannot perform for such "subjective" reasons as fi-
nancial hardship remains bound in contract. See, e.g., B's Co. v. B.P. Barber &
Assocs., 391 F.2d 130, 137 (4th Cir. 1968) (subjective impossibility does not ex-
cuse performance); see also Henszey, UCC Section 2-615--Does Impracticabil-
ity Mean Impossibility?, 10 U.C.C. L.J. 107, 108 (1977) (suggesting that courts
selectively equate common-law impossibility with the UCC term
"impracticability").
7. The term "frustration" developed in English law to include "frustra-
tion of the purpose" of the contract, "frustration of the adventure," or simply
"frustration of the voyage." "Frustration" generally gives rise to nonperform-
ance when the "purpose" of the contract is rendered "substantially," "funda-
mentally," or "radically" more difficult or costly to render, although not
physically impossible. See Cow, supra note 4, at 291-93; McNair, Frustration of
1985]
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commercial impracticability.9
The erosion of the rigid general rule began with a number
Contracts by War, 56 LAW Q. REV. 173, 176 (1940); Webber, supra note 4, at
285.
The doctrine of "frustration" has been incorporated into American law.
See U.C.C. § 2-615 comment 3 (frustration doctrine incorporated in U.C.C. § 2-
615(a)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 266, 267 (1981) (existing
and supervening frustration); see also Corbin, supra note 4, at 4; Comment,
Contracts-Frustration of Purpose, 59 MICH. L. REV. 98, 98-100 (1960). In
Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944), the court stated: "Although
the doctrine of frustration is akin to the doctrine of impossibility of perform-
ance ... frustration is not a form of impossibility even under the modern def-
inition of that term .... Performance remains possible but the expected
value of performance ... has been destroyed by a fortuitous event .. " Id.
at 53, 153 P.2d at 50; see also Hass v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 495 F. Supp. 815,
819 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (party will be discharged from performance only when the
purpose of the contract is substantially frustrated by a supervening event); Ma
v. Community Bank, 494 F. Supp. 252, 257 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (frustration present
only when a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated by a super-
vening occurrence or event the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assump-
tion on which the contract was made); Lord v. Wheeler, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 282,
283 (1854) (building contract frustrated when the subject building was de-
stroyed by fire).
8. The doctrine of devastating force (force majeure) is variously referred
to as "force majesture," Fogg v. Van Saun Coal Co., 12 N.J. Misc. 680, 681, 174
A. 419, 420 (1934); "fuerza mayor," American Sur. Co. v. Batangan, 19 Phil-
lipine 110, 111 (1911); and "vis majeur," Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T.
Ltd., 29 Cal. 2d 228, 238, 174 P.2d 441, 447 (1946). The exact scope of force
majeure is unclear. Some courts have limited the doctrine to acts of God. See,
e.g., Losecco v. Gregory, 108 La. 648, 655, 32 So. 985, 986 (1901) (freezing of or-
ange grove held to be an act of God). Others have extended it to include
strikes and breakdowns in machinery. See, e.g., Matsoukis v. Priestman & Co.,
[1915] 1 K.B. 681, 685-87 (strikes). In Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T. Ltd.,
29 Cal. 2d at 238, 174 P.2d at 447, the court extended force majeure beyond acts
of God to include any insuperable interference occurring without the party's
intervention that could not have been prevented by the party's prudence, dili-
gence, or care. See also Curtis Elevator Co. v. Hampshire House, Inc., 142 N.J.
Super. 537, 544, 362 A.2d 73, 77 (1976) (unforeseeable strike found to be a su-
pervening event). On "force majeure" in French law, see CODE CIVIL art. 1148
(70th ed. Dalloz 1973); cf. A. TUNC & H. MAZEAUD, 2 TRAITE THEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE 558-67 (1958).
9. For discussions of the doctrine of "commercial impracticibility," see
generally Duesenberg, Contract Impracticability, Courts Begin to Shape Sec-
tion 2-615, 32 Bus. LAW. 1089 (1977); Hawkland, The Energy Crisis and Section
2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 79 CoM. L.J. 75 (1974); Joskow, Com-
mercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 119 (1977); Rosenn, Protecting Contracts from Inflation, 33 Bus.
LAW. 729 (1978); Schmitt & Wollschlager, Section 2-615-"Commercial Imprac-
ticability'" Making the Impracticable Practicable, 81 COM. L.J. 9 (1976); Spel-
del, supra note 3, at 369; Note, UC.C. Section 2-615: Sharp Inflationary
Increases in Cost as Excuse from Performance in Contract, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 297 (1974); Comment, Commercial Impracticability and Intent in UCC.
Section 2-615: A Reconciliation, 9 CONN. L. REV. 266 (1977).
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of nineteenth century English cases excusing the performance
of contracts interrupted by unforeseen occurrences. In Taylor
v. Caldwell,o for example, the court excused performance of a
contract for the rental of a music hall on grounds of impossibil-
ity when the hall was destroyed by fire. In Krell v. Henry,"
the court excused a promise to pay rent when the purpose of
the contract, the viewing of a coronation procession, was frus-
trated by the cancellation of the parade. Over time, courts ex-
panded the excuses from performance to include the death of
the promisor, the sinking of a ship at sea, wars and war-related
contingencies, strikes, lockouts, and other vagaries in the pro-
duction and delivery of goods and services.12
The expansion of the nonperformance doctrines is attribu-
table largely to the use of judicial fictions.13 Early courts rea-
soned that the "foundation," "object," or "basis" of a contract
had "disappeared" or was "destroyed" when an unforeseen and
intervening occurrence disrupted performance of the contract.14
Some courts, for example, held that the "basic assumption" of
10. [1863] 3 Best & Smith 826, 122 E.R. 309.
11. [1903] 2 K.B. 740.
12. See authorities cited supra notes 4-9.
13. See Trakman, supra note 4, at 41. These judicial fictions can be traced
back to such early cases as Taylor v. Caldwell, [1863] 3 Best & Smith 826, 122
E.R 309, in which the court implied an excuse by law "because... it is appar-
ent that the parties contracted on the basis of the continued existence" of the
music hall that subsequently burned down. Id. at 830, 122 E.R. at 814 (empha-
sis added); see also Scott & Sons v. Del Sel, 1922 Sess. Cas. 592, 596-97, affd,
1923 Sess. Cas. 37 (H.L. Scotland) (implying terms on assumption that contract
existed). Justice Holmes once said of the implied term fiction:
You can always imply a condition in a contract. But why do you im-
ply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community
or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short be-
cause of some attitude of yours [the court's] upon a matter not capable
of... founding exact logical conclusions. Such matters really are
battle grounds where the means do not exist for determinations that
shall be good for all time, and where the decision can do no more than
embody the preference of a given body in a given time and place.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 466 (1897); see also Farns-
worth, supra note 4, at 867 (suggesting that conditions may be implied).
14. For the origin of the "objects" or "purposes" approach in the common
law, see Krell v. Henry, [1903] KIB. 740, 747. In Krell, the court held that the
"purpose" of a rental contract, to view a coronation procession, had failed. In
fact, however, only the tenant's "object" had failed when the procession was
cancelled; the "object" of the promisee-landlord had not failed because a prof-
itable lease still was possible. Only through judicial construction did the "ob-
ject" of both parties fail. See also R. McELRoY & G. WILUAMS, IMPOSSIBILITY
OF PERFORMANCE 83-94 (1941); L. TRAnKAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE
EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAw 92-93 (1983); Corbin, supra note 4, at 4;
Wade, supra note 4, at 536-37.
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the contract "failed"15 or that performance after the disruption
constituted a "radically different" obligation from the perform-
ance contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting.'(
Other courts indulged in the speculation that if the parties at
15. In Neal-Copper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th
Cir. 1974), the court set out the following prerequisites to an excuse under
U.C.C. § 2-615: "(1) a contingency must occur (2) performance must thereby
be made 'impracticable' and (3) the non-occurrence of the contingency must
have been a basic assumption on which the contract was made." Id. at 293; see
also Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc., 600 F.2d 103,
111 (7th Cir. 1979); Heat Exchangers, Inc. v. Map Constr. Corp., 34 Md. App.
679, 684, 368 A.2d 1088, 1091 (1977). The element of a nonoccurrence of a "ba-
sic assumption" presupposes that contractors conclude agreements with a par-
ticular "assumption" in mind, without which they would not have contracted
or would have contracted on different terms. As a result, this assumption
need not be expressed in the agreement but may be "reconstructed" by judi-
cial supposition. See Patterson, supra note 4, at 913; Trakman, supra note 4, at
45.
16. In the English cases dealing with the blockage of the Suez Canal In
1956, the courts examined whether the need for an extended trip around the
Cape of Good Hope converted the arrangement into a "radically different"
agreement than the one originally concluded. With few exceptions, the Eng-
lish courts refused to excuse performance, except where the contract itself
provided for a right of nonperformance. See Tsakiroglou & Co., Ltd. v. Noblee
Thorl G.M.B.H., [1959] 1 All E.R. 45, 48, modified, [1960] 2 Q.B. 318, 325, affd,
[1961] 2 All E.R. 179 (H.L.); Albert D. Gaon & Co. v. Soci~t6 Interprofession-
nelle des Oligineux Fluides Alimentaires, [1959] 2 All E.R. 693, 698-700, modi-
fied, [1960] 2 Q.B. 318, 334-41, affd, [1961] 2 All E.R. 179 (H.L.); Soci6t6
Franco-Tunisienne D'Armement v. Sidermar S.P.A., [1961] 2 Q.B. 278; Ocean
Tramp Tankers Corp. v. V/O Sovfracht (The Eugenia), [1964] 2 Q.B. 226 (C.A.)
(per Denning, J.A.) at 239; (Donovan, J.A.) at 244. But see Carapanayoti &
Co., Ltd. v. E.T. Green, Ltd., [1959] 1 Q.B. 131, 148 (obligation to perform a con-
tract of sale following the Suez Canal blockage constituted "an obligation of
... a different kind which the agreement did not contemplate"). For a de-
tailed analysis of the Suez Canal cases, see the Queen's Bench decision in
Palmco Shipping Inc. v. Continental Ore Corp. (The Captain George K.), [1970]
2 L1.L. Rep. 21 (Q.B.) (per Macotta, J.), at 24; see also Trakman, Interpreting
Contracts: A Common Law Dilemma, 59 CAN. B. REV. 241, 262-65 (1981).
American Suez Canal cases have developed along similar lines. In Trans-
atlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966), for example,
a merchant shipowner sought to be excused from performance on grounds
that voyage costs increased as a result of the closure of the Suez Canal.
Although it declined to excuse the performance, the court observed that the
doctrine of impossibility is invoked when "[the] community's interest in having
contracts enforced . . . is outweighed by the commercial senselessness of re-
quiring performance." Id. at 315 (emphasis added). The threshold of "com-
mercial senselessness," like the threshold of "radical difference," is inevitably
at that complex point at which a difference of degree becomes a difference of
kind. See Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957,
991 (5th Cir. 1976) ("The rationale for the doctrine of commercial impractica-
bility is that the circumstance causing the breach has made performance so vi-
tally different from what was anticipated that the contract cannot reasonably
be thought to govern."). But see American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l
[Vol. 69:471
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the time of contracting had "anticipated" or "foreseen" the con-
tingencies that disrupted the performance, they would have re-
frained from entering into the agreement.1 7 Although
frequently discussed by judges, these imaginative rationales
have usually not induced courts to grant excuses from
performance.18
Both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Uni-
form Commercial Code maintain the earlier practice of creating
doctrine by way of fiction. The Code, for example, provides for
nonperformance in the event of the "failure of a basic assump-
tion" because of "unforeseen supervening circumstances not
within the contemplation of the parties."' 9 The Code thus per-
petuates the fiction that underlying each contract is a "basic as-
sumption" that the court is able to identify by ex post facto
inquiry2O and that a judicial finding of "commercial impractica-
Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1972) (increase in cost not sufficient to
excuse performance).
17. See, eg., Chicago, M. & S.P. Ry. v. Hoyt, 149 U.S. 1, 15 (1892) (occur-
rence of event not in contemplation of parties at time of contracting will dis-
charge obligation even though the language of the contract could be read to
include the contingency); Williams Grain Co. v. Leval & Co., 277 F.2d 213, 215
(8th Cir. 1960) (occurrence of event not ordinarily anticipated and without the
fault of the proisor excuses performance); Martin v. Star Pub. Co., 50 Del.
(11 Ter.) 181,191, 126 A.2d 238, 244 (1956) (court may supply terms that parties
certainly would have agreed to had such terms been proposed); Nabao, Inc. v.
Riverview Realty Co., 87 Nev. 55, 57, 482 P.2d 305, 307 (1971) (defense of im-
possibility available to one whose performance is made impossible or impracti-
cable by the occurrence of unforeseen contingencies); Crown Embroidery
Works v. Gordon, 190 A.D. 472, 474, 180 N.Y.S. 158, 160 (1920) (subsequent un-
foreseeable illegality of contract performance discharges obligation). But see
Madeirense Do Brassil S/A v. Stulman-Emrick Lumber Co., 147 F.2d 399, 404
(2d Cir. 1945) (seller assumed foreseeable risk of shortage of delivery ships
during wartime); Berg v. Erickson, 234 F. 817, 821 (8th Cir. 1916) (parties im-
pliedly allocated foreseeable risk of drought).
18. See, eg., McLouth Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 570 F.2d 594,
609 (6th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 801 (1978); Iowa Elec. Light & Power
Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 134-37 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert denied 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Pub-
licker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
989, 992-93 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F.
Supp. 429, 437-42 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co.,
583 S.W_2d 721, 725-26 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979). But see
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 79-80 (W.D. Pa.
1980) (contract reformed where large increase in nonlabor production costs
found not foreseeable). See generally Duesenberg, Exiting from Bad Bargains
via U.CC Section 2-615: An Impractical Dream, 13 U.C.C. UJ. 32, 36-38 (1980)
(foreseeable risks generally do not give rise to commercial impracticability).
19. U.C.C. § 2-615; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152
comment b, illustrations 1-6 (1981).
20. These "basic assumptions" are undoubtedly difficult to determine.
1985]
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bility" reflects what the parties would themselves have decided
had they anticipated the intervening disruption.21 In most
cases, however, courts cannot determine realistically what the
"basic assumptions" of the parties were at the time of con-
tracting, either because one or both of the parties had no such
assumptions in mind or, even if they had, because they proba-
bly did not reveal those assumptions. 22 Courts also cannot as-
certain what the parties "contemplated" except by the process
of ex post facto inquiry into and attribution of the parties' sup-
posed "contemplations." As one commentator has noted, at
work in the judicial re-creation of the parties' intent is often an
"apologetic fiction which deprecates the part played by state
policy and personal judgment in the administration of law."23
The fictions in the "construction" of contractual intention
are well-recognized. Some bolder courts, however, have de-
Professor Arthur Corbin criticized the "basic assumptions" test not only for its
lack of clarity, but also for its failure to deal with the central issue of risk allo-
cation "in accordance with the requirements of 'justice.'" See 6 A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 605, at 638-39 (1962). For discussions of the relation-
ship between a "failure of basic assumptions" and a "mistake," see 13 S. WaIL
LISTON, CONTRACTS § 1544, at 94-100 (3d ed. 1970); Rabin, A Proposed Black-
Letter Rule Concerning Mistaken Assumptions in Bargain Transactions, 45
TEx. L. REV. 1273, 1285-86 (1967); see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex
Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 63-67 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Tombigbee Constructors v.
United States, 420 F.2d 1037, 1041 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Guthrie v. Times-Mirror Co.,
51 Cal. App. 3d 879, 887-88, 124 Cal. Rptr. 577, 582-83 (1975); Nordyke &
Marmon Co. v. Kehlor, 155 Mo. 643, 653-57, 56 S.W. 287, 288-91 (1900); Hinson
v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 430, 215 S.E.2d 101, 107 (1975).
21. See supra note 13.
22. A contractor may fail to deal with an issue by agreement because no
risk was contemplated or because it had contemplated the risk but considered
it unimportant, unlikely to occur, or difficult to incorporate into the contract.
See Chafee, The Disorderly Conduct of Words, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 381, 385-88,
398-402 (1941); Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the Law of Contract, 76 YALE L.J.
939, 945-47 (1967); Trakman, supra note 4, at 42; Williams, Language and the
Law, 61 LAW Q. REV. 384, 401-06 (1945).
23. Patterson, Conditions, supra note 4, at 913. Often the court achieves
this construction of the parties' intentions by maintaining that the contract has
a casus omissus, or missing term, that the court needs to "fill in" for the par-
ties. For a discussion of such judicial "gap-filling," see Corbin, Recent Develop-
ments in the Law of Contracts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 449, 465-66 (1937);
Farnsworth, Some Considerations in the Drafting of Agreements: Problems in
Interpretation and Gap-filling, 39 OKLA. B. ASS'N J. 917, 917-24 (1968);
Trakman, supra note 16, at 280-94. Criticizing the judicial construction of the
parties' "intention" out of their presumed expectations, Professor Farnsworth
thoughtfully observes: "First, where there are no expectations, [the fiction]
masks the real issues by encouraging courts to rationalize their treatment of
casus omissi by means of a fictitious intention. And second, even where there
are expectations, it distorts them by casting them in the form of contract
terms." Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 867-68.
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clined to indulge extensively in a fruitless chase after the inten-
tion of the parties, preferring instead to do what seems "just
and reasonable" in the circumstances. 24
On the other hand, many courts tend to view excuse for
nonperformance as a very narrow concept that should not be
readily used to terminate contractual obligations. These courts
reason that because there are few disruptions of performance
that parties could not foresee in modern times of political and
economic uncertainty, parties engaged in commercial transac-
tions should be bound to fulfill their unqualified promises with-
out excuse.25 Moreover, a promisor who assumes an obligation
without obtaining a contingent release clause should not be per-
mitted to escape liability for breach at the expense of the prom-
isee. Courts have refused to excuse energy suppliers from their
petroleum and natural gas contracts, for example, notwith-
standing the energy crises of the 1970's and the resulting in-
flated prices and rising costs of performance.26 Refusing to
excuse Gulf Oil Corporation from performance of a supply con-
tract, the court in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp.27 ob-
served that it was "justified in taking judicial notice of the fact
that oil has been used as a political weapon with increasing suc-
cess by the oil-producing nations for many years, and Gulf was
24. See Trakman, supra note 4, at 39-45. British judges Lord Wright and
Lord Denning frequently argued that excuses from performance should be
granted on grounds of "fairness and reasonableness," even when the contract
itself was silent on the issue: "A modern court should realize what is its ideal,
that of doing justice according to the actual facts, though on lines of estab-
lished law." LoRD WRIGHT, ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 385 (1939); see also
Denny, Mott & Dickson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co., [1944] A.C. 265, 275;
Cricklewood Prop. & Inv. Trust Ltd., and Others v. Leighton's Inv. Trust Ltd.,
[1945] A.C. 221, 61 T.L.R. 202, 206. For an American perspective on this ap-
proach, see Corbin, supra note 4, at 4; see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex
Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 89-91 (W.D. Pa. 1980); National Presto Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 112 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
25. See supra notes 5 & 18.
26. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 989, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (increased cost and difficulty in rendering
supply not sufficient to justify excuse); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody
Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 728 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979)
(increased costs not alone sufficient to excuse performance); Maple Farms,
Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 1083, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784, 788 (1974)
(increased price of supplies insufficient to excuse performance). But see Gay v.
Seafarer Fiberglass Yachts, Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1335, 1337
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1974) (permitting claim of energy crisis to be presented to the
jury for its determination of whether an excuse from performance should be
allowed); see also Berman, supra note 4, at 1417 (nonperformance doctrine lib-
eralized in the area of international trade).
27. 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
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well aware of and assumed the risk that the OPEC nations
would do exactly what they [did]."28
Some commentators have suggested that the availability of
an excuse from performance should depend on which party is
the "superior risk bearer."29 The determination of risk-bearing
superiority in turn depends on an economic analysis of the re-
spective abilities of each party to sustain the risk associated
with performance. In the interest of economic efficiency, the
party who is better able to bear that risk must, under this anal-
ysis, ultimately sustain the loss.30 The analysis is thereby di-
verted from a doctrinal preoccupation with the limits to which
promises should be sanctified to an evaluation of the circum-
stances in which such sanctity is justified as a matter of eco-
nomic efficiency.31
Courts need not focus exclusively on ascertaining which
party, for doctrinal, economic, or other reasons, should be held
responsible for the entire cost of nonperformance. Past experi-
ence in both common- and civil-law jurisdictions demonstrates
that the allocation of losses arising from nonperformance is a
logical and equitable alternative to the imposition of the full
loss upon one contracting party. Legislation in Germany after
the First World War, for example, empowered German courts
to revalue contract prices in response to the rapid decline of the
German mark.32 Similar enactments in Europe after the Sec-
28. Id. at 442.
29. See, e.g., Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977); see also in-
fra note 31.
30. Three factors assist in determining which party is the "superior risk
bearer": "Knowledge of the magnitude of the loss, knowledge of the
probability that it will occur, and other costs of self- or market-insurance."
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 29, at 117.
31. See id The search for the "superior risk bearer" presupposes that one
party is the superior risk bearer, that that party can be ascertained by after-
the-fact judicial inquiry, and most pertinently, that the "superior risk bearer"
should sustain the full loss arising out of that risk. This approach does not
contemplate loss sharing between the superior and inferior risk bearers. For
further economic analysis concerning commercial impracticability, see Ashley,
The Economic Implications of the Doctrine of Impossibility, 26 HASTINGS L.J.
1251, 1262-70 (1975); Birmingham, A Second Look at the Suez Canal Cases: Ex-
cuse for Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic
Theory, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1393, 1406-12 (1969); Schlegel, supra note 4, at 441-42;
Speidel, Excusable Nonperformance In Sales Contracts: Some Thoughts About
Risk Management, 32 S.C.L. REV. 241, 242-44 (1980).
32. For discussions of the enormous upheavals in the German economy
following the First World War and their effects on contracts of sale, see Cohn,
Frustration of Contract in German Law, pts. III & IV, 28 J. COMP. LEGIS. &
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ond World War enabled courts to adjust the prices and condi-
tions of delivery in commercial contracts to limit the negative
consequences of a devastated European economy.33 European
tribunals in the postwar period have continued to adjust the
conditions of commercial contracts, either by finding that code
sections such as the "good faith" article of the German Civil
Code warrant the modification of contract terms 34 or by adopt-
ing an open textual method of interpretation to the same end.35
Prominent common-law legislatures have also recognized
the virtues of loss sharing. The Frustrated Contracts Act,36 en-
acted in the United Kingdom in 1943, illustrates the flexibility
of a loss-sharing scheme. The Act, however, provides only lim-
ited guidance in the actual allocation of loss.37 The Uniform
INT'L L. 15 (1946); Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private Contracts: Ger-
many, 1914-1924, 33 MICH. L. REv. 171 (1934); Dawson, Judicial Revision of
Frustrated Contracts: Germany, 63 B.U.L. REV. 1039 (1983); Hay, Frustration
and Its Solution in German Law, 10 AM. J. CoMP. L. 345, 356-66 (1961).
33. See 2 A. COLIN & H. CAPITANT, CouRs ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANCAis § 130 (1948); 2 L MAZEAUD, TRAITE THEORETIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE § 1579 (1949); 2 A. TRASBOT, LA DEVALUATION
MONETAIRE ET LES CONTRACTS DE Daorr PmvE: LE Daorr FRANCAIS AU MI.
LIEU DU XXE SIECLE, ETUDES OFFERTES A GEORGES RIPERT 159 (1950).
34. See Hay, supra note 32, at 356-58.
35. See Hay, supra note 32, at 360; see also P. DURAND, INFLUENCE DE LA
DEPRECIATION MONETIVE SUR LA VIE JURIDIQUE PRIVEE (1961); Drachsler,
Frustration of Contract: Comparative Law Aspects of Remedies in Cases of
Supervening Illegality, 3 N.Y.L.F. 50, 62 (1957); Smit, supra note 4, at 293-303.
For a detailed discussion of judicial "reformation" of contracts in various civil
law jurisdictions, see Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp.
53, 93-94 (W.D. Pa 1980).
36. The Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 6 & 7 GEO. VI, c. 40
(1943). Discussions of the Act include G. WILLiAtS, THE LAW REFORM (FRus.
TRATED CONTRACTS) ACT, 1943 (1944); Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed
Compromise-the Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U.L. REV. 750, 763-64
(1964); Comment, Quasi-Contract-Impossibility of Performance-Restitution
of Money Paid or Benefits Conferred Wihen Further Performance is Excused,
46 MICH. L. REV. 401,406-07 (1948); see also Donovan, Law Reform in Victoria,
1960 J. Bus. L. 62; Falconbridge, Frustrated Contracts: The Need for Law Re-
form, 23 CAN. B. REv. 469 (1945).
37. The Frustrated Contracts Act specifically empowers courts to make
adjustments only in relation to down payments and expenses deducted from
such down payments; it does not provide for adjustment of all performance
losses. The Act provides:
§1(2). All sums paid or payable to any party in pursuance of the
contract before the time when the parties were so discharged ...
shall, in the case of sums so paid, be recoverable from him... and, in
the case of sums so payable, cease to be so payable: Provided that, if
the party to whom the sums were so paid or payable incurred ex-
penses before the time of discharge in, or for the purpose of, the per-
formance of the contract, the court may, if it considers it just to do so
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, allow him to retain
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Commercial Code is similarly open-ended. Under section 2-615,
a judicial adjustment of losses is permissible in the interests of
"good faith" and "justice," but the Code, like the Frustrated
Contracts Act, provides little concrete guidance to courts faced
with an allocation problem.38
The Code's blanket, but unqualified, grant of authority has
generally prompted United States courts to search for an abso-
lute excuse on grounds of "impossibility" or "commercial im-
practicability."39 An excuse for nonperformance is either
or, as the case may be, recover the whole or any part of the sums so
paid or payable, not being an amount in excess of the expenses so in-
curred.
§1(3). Where any party to the contract has, by reason of anything
done by any party thereto in, or for the purpose of, the performance
of the contract obtained a valuable benefit (other than a payment of
money to which the last foregoing subsection [§§ 1(2) quoted above]
applies) before the time of discharge, there shall be recoverable from
him by the said other party such sum (if any), not exceeding the value
of the said benefit to the party obtaining it, as the court considers just,
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, and, in particular,
(a) the amount of any expenses incurred before the time of discharge
by the benefited party in, or for the purpose of, the performance of
the contract, including any sums paid or payable by him to any other
party in pursuance of the contract and retained or recoverable by that
party under the last foregoing subsection, and (b) the effect, in rela-
tion to the said benefit, of the circumstances giving rise to the frustra-
tion of the contract.
6 & 7 GEO. IV, c. 40, §§1(2)-(3) (1943). For a discussion of this legislation and
an appeal for similar enactments in the United States, see Comment, Appor-
tioning Loss After Discharge of a Burdensome Contract: A Statutory Solution,
69 YALE L.J. 1054, 1074-89 (1960); see also infra text accompanying notes 96-
101.
38. Comment 6 to U.C.C. § 2-615 provides:
In situations in which neither sense nor justice is served by either
answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of "excuse" or "no ex-
cuse," adjustment under the various provisions of this Article is nec-
essary, especially the sections on good faith, on insecurity and
assurance and on the reading of all provisions in the light of their
purposes, and the general policy of this Act to use equitable principles
in furtherance of commercial standards and good faith.
The general language of § 2-615 and its comments provide no clear indica-
tion as to how the court is to "adjust" performance losses, what "good faith"
should encompass, or how the "purposes" and "general policy" of the U.C.C.
should be construed in relation to performance. See supra note 6. The Re-
statement (Second) is similarly unhelpful, except insofar as it provides that
"justice" is deemed to include "protection" of the parties' "reliance interest":
"[Iln any case governed by the rules stated in [this] chapter [dealing with im-
practicability of performance and mistake], if those rules together with the
rules stated in Chapter 16 [Remedies] will not avoid injustice, the court may
grant relief on such terms as justice requires including protection of the par-
ties' reliance interests." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272(2)
(1981).
39. See, e.g., American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine Ltd.,
(Vol. 69:471
COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY
granted or emphatically denied. Judicial refusal to excuse per-
formance is usually premised on either or both of two principal
rationales: the promisor was reasonably able to foresee the dis-
ruptive contingency at the time of contracting, or the promisor
should have avoided the consequences of the disruption by tak-
ing precautions in the language of the contract itself or by
otherwise insuring against foreseeable loss.40
In Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp.,41 for
example, the court declined to excuse a uranium producer from
performance of its supply contract despite an almost sevenfold
increase in the market price of uranium following the alleged
formation of a uranium cartel. The court stated that "[w]here
the occurrences complained of are in some degree foreseeable
and capable of being protected against contractually .... and
where it is impossible to determine what share of the increase
is attributable to unforeseen conditions,. . . it becomes unnec-
essary to [decide] how much increase constitutes impracticabil-
ity."42 Although it was willing to engage in an ex post
examination of the defendant's foresight, the court found that
it was unable to determine with certainty the extent to which
the defendant actually foresaw the rising cost of energy at the
time of contracting. This result is not surprising. Any determi-
nation by way of hindsight is unlikely to be subject to accurate
verification because the defendant will have every economic
453 F.2d 939, 942 (2d Cir. 1972); Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363
F.2d 312, 315-16 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp.,
467 F. Supp. 129, 139-40 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301
(8th Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 440 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union
Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989, 991-92 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 1085-86, 352 N.Y.S.2d
784, 788 (1974); Portland Section of the Council of Jewish Women v. Sisters of
Charity, 266 Or. 448, 457-58, 513 P.2d 1183, 1188 (1973); see also Wallach, The
Excuse Defense in the Law of Contracts: Judicial Frustration of the .CC At-
tempt to Liberalize the Law of Commercial Impracticability, 55 NOTRE DAMiE
LAw. 203, 217 (1979).
A few courts have excused a party under the doctrine of commercial im-
practicability because of significant increases in the costs of performance.
These cases, however, generally have been limited to changes in the contem-
plated mode of performance. See e.g., Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n,
523 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Alaska 1974); City of Vernon v. City of Los Angeles, 45
Cal. 2d 710, 717-21, 290 P.2d 841, 845-48 (1955); Mineral Park Land Co. v. How-
ard, 172 Cal. 289, 292-93, 156 P. 458, 459-60 (1916).
40. See supra notes 4-5.
41. 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d
1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
42. Id. at 135.
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reason to persuade the court that the contingency was not con-
templated at the relevant point in time. What is particularly
surprising is the court's mechanical resolution of doubt as to
the promisor's foresight by its absolute denial of any form of re-
lief to the defendant. Partial foresight and partial control over
disruptive contingencies may justify partial relief. By opting
for no relief, the Iowa Electric court seriously undermined its
capacity to modify the agreement in the face of undoubted eco-
nomic hardship.
II. A NEW REGIME OF REMEDIES
A. THE BENEFITS OF Loss SHARING
Under a new regime of remedies, doubt over the permissi-
ble extent of relief afforded by the doctrine of commercial im-
practicability may be resolved by calculating the proportions in
which each party should assume responsibility for the ultimate
loss. Approaching questions of commercial impracticability as a
remedial matter does not avoid the preliminary question of
whether a state of commercial impracticability in fact exists.
This preliminary question diminishes in importance, however,
when primary focus is given to determining the proportions in
which the parties should share performance losses. Questions
concerning the permissible extent of relief should therefore be
resolved by deciding the proportions in which each party
should assume responsibility for the ultimate loss. Proportion-
ate loss-allocation may be based on a number of factors, includ-
ing the nature of the performance risk, the capacity of each
party to exercise "control" over that risk, and the effects that
competing allocations of performance risk likely would have on
dependent producer and consumer interests. The ultimate goal
of this remedial regime is to redirect the doctrine of commer-
cial impracticability from its limited role as an excuse doctrine
to its potentially more useful function as a remedial doctrine.
The remedial application of commercial impracticability
doctrine would not require that the promisor be excused com-
pletely from the obligation to perform in every case. 43 The sug-
gested application proposes only that the promisor may be
43. Particular types of business ventures, however, may be singled out for
the strict enforcement of obligations because the promisor foresaw and was
able to "control" the risk of loss. See Berman, supra note 4, at 1428-36;
Trakman, supra note 16, at 258-65. The language of the contract, however,
should be examined in each case to determine the limits of each party's "as-
sumption of risk." See infra notes 106-107.
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relieved from some performance obligations, depending in each
case on the degree to which the promisor could have foreseen
and avoided the risk of loss by taking precautionary or other
risk-averse measures. The regime of remedies permits an abso-
lute excuse from performance in only three circumstances:
where the promisor bargained for such an excuse in its agree-
merit; when such an excuse can be fairly inferred from the
course of dealings between the parties; or where the denial of
an excuse might produce substantial public injury or commu-
nity harm. To relieve the promisor from responsibility com-
pletely would be to ignore the promisor's superior position, in
most cases, to avert, or at least mitigate, the consequences of
performance disruptions.44
The need for a new regime of remedies is particularly evi-
dent from the realization that in the vast majority of cases the
principal cause of nonperformance is attributable to an extra-
neous factor-an external casualty, an act of God, an energy
crisis, or a period of rapid inflation-the effects of which
neither party could completely prevent or delay. To hold one
party wholly liable or, alternatively, completely free of respon-
sibility for, the ensuing nonperformance is fundamentally un-
just in cases in which neither party was originally responsible
for causing the intervening disruption of the agreement and
where at least one party must bear the economic burden flow-
ing from the loss. Shared responsibility, albeit in differing pro-
portions, requires both parties to assume a part of the loss.45
44. Contractors often revise their form contracts to take account of new
events after each "novel" contingency has occured. See generally Butte. A
New Contract Through Old Eyes, 13 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1 (1977); Freehill, Mutu-
ally Excepted Perils, 49 TUL. L. REV. 899 (1975); Holmes, Negotiating, Drafting
and Enforcing Coal Supply Contracts, 9 NAT'L RESOURCES LAW. 353 (1976);
Hurst, Drafting Contracts in an Inflationary Era, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 879
(1976); Rosenn, supra note 9; Scott, Coal Supply Agreements, 23 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INsT. 107 (1977); Trakman, Nonperformance in Oil, 29 OIL & GAS TAX
Q. 716 (1981); Williams, Coping with Acts of God, Strikes, and Other Delights-
The Use of Force Majeure Provisions in Mining Contracts, 22 ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INsT. 433 (1976).
45. Typical of a case in which both parties were viewed as equally capable
of foreseeing the risk of inflation is Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal
Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979), in which
the court remarked.
The facts as shown by the record lead to the conclusion that at
least some of the loss resulted from the fact that for some unex-
plained reason the Industrial Commodities Index lagged behind the
Consumer Price Index, the measuring factor first proposed by
Peabody, in reflecting inflationary cost increases. That such indexes
were based upon different commercial and economic factors was pre-
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The imposition of total loss on only one party may lead to
distinct economic disutility in cases in which both parties could
sustain the loss more efficiently. Moreover, the economic hard-
ship sustained by a single risk bearer can have onerous ramifi-
cations within a wider community of interests. Holding energy
suppliers fully responsible for losses caused by extraneous cir-
cumstances, for example, not only imposes financial hardship
on those suppliers; it may also bring devastating consequences
to a large, innocent group of interdependent producers and sup-
pliers and to the ultimate consumers relying on the distribution
network. Loss sharing may dilute the harshness of such nega-
tive economic consequences.
B. CONTRACT REFORMATION
Contract reformation is one alternative in a new regime of
impracticability remedies. In an era in which costs and prices
vary drastically over time, the need to develop a method for
modifying contracts is especially pressing.4 6 Although past pat-
terns of inflation suggest that parties to long-term contracts
should anticipate the risk of inflation during the term of their
agreement, the reality of inflation alone does not necessarily
mean that the parties will be able to predict the timing or se-
verity of inflation patterns or the effects inflation might have
on performance. Courts have recognized that "[f]oreseeability
or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its allo-
cation." 47 The fact that a supplier could continue to perform
commercial obligations without upward adjustment of the price
sumably known by both parties since each was skilled and exper-
ienced in those areas and the divergence between the indexes could
not be said to be unforeseeable. Be that as it may, Peabody agreed to
the use of the Industrial Commodities Index factor.
Id, at 728. The court nevertheless concluded, "It is apparent that Peabody did
make a bad bargain and an unprofitable one under its contract with Public
Service resulting in a loss, the cause and size of which is disputed." Id.
46. See Speidel, supra note 3, at 392-400; Note, supra note 9; Comment,
Relief from Burdensome Long-Term Contracts: Commercial Impracticability,
Frustration of Purpose, Mutual Mistake of Fact, and Equitable Adjustment, 47
Mo. L. REv. 79 (1982); Comment, Equitable Reformation of Long-Term Con-
tracts-The "New Spirit" of ALCOA, 4 UTAH L. REV. 985 (1982). But see Daw-
son, supra note 3, at 4-38 (judicial adjustment of performance obligations is
unnecessary).
47. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 76 (W.D.
Pa. 1980) (quoting Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318
(D.C. Cir. 1966)). But see Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P.2d 47 (1944), in
which Chief Justice Traynor reflected: "If it was foreseeable there should
have been provision for it in the contract, and the absence of such a provision
gives rise to the inference that the risk was assumed." Id. at 54, 153 P.2d at 50.
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term also does not require that strict performance be ordered.
The purchaser may have been equally able to anticipate the
risk of inflation and equally capable of taking precautions
against its harmful effects through business planning, self-in-
surance, or market insurance.48
Contract modification is often inappropriate in cases in-
volving low-volume, short-term contracts in which the parties
can plan their affairs on the basis of known risks having ascer-
tainable effects on performance.49 Modification is far more jus-
tifiable, however, when interdependent parties have bound
themselves for a long period of time to perform in a market
that is relatively closed to alternatives.50
48. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 79
(W.D. Pa. 1980); see also cases cited infra note 67.
49. In such cases, neither party stands to suffer significantly because the
volume of the transaction is presumably low. Nor are the interests of the com-
munity at large likely to be harmed by either enforcement or termination of
the transaction because the goods and services involved usually will be readily
available elsewhere. Absent a continuing relationship between the parties, al-
tering the short-term contract would usually be fruitless. See MacNeil, Con-
tracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854, 902 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as MacNeil, Economic Relations]; see also MacNeil, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Contractual Relations, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1018, 1027-28
(1981); MacNeil, Power, Contract and the Economic Mode4 14 J. EcoN. ISSUES
909, 912 (1980).
Professor Ian R. MacNeil suggests that a distinction be drawn between
"transactional" and "relational" business ventures. Whereas "transactional"
ventures involve "simple, monetizable economic exchanges," "relational" ven-
tures introduce "complex personal-noneconomic satisfactions." MacNeil, Eco-
nomic Relations, supra, at 902. "Transactional" ventures involve distinctly
short-term agreements that are clearly and succintly expressed. "Relational"
ventures, on the other hand, involve continuous long-term relations that often
are not fully articulated and need to be revised periodically. Id. at 903. The
all-or-nothing approach of the classical law of impossibility clearly resembles
"transactional" ventures. The parties are presumed to enter into clearly de-
fined and short-term arrangements in which their performance obligations are
succintly allocated by contract. Most importantly, if such obligations are not
performed timely and completely, the transaction lapses. Courts should not
attempt to reform such "discrete" transactions.
50. Whereas "discrete transactions" are conducted largely between mar-
ket "strangers," "relational arrangements" give rise to associations among par-
ties over extended periods of time. Contracts are used in such relationships to
regulate performance, but their terms are modified by explicit agreement or
by conduct over the course of the agreement period. "Relations" adapt to mar-
ket change. They vary in accordance with the reciprocal good faith of the par-
ties, and they affect and are affected by a community of dependent interests.
Such "relationships" are also marked by a reluctance to seek or "find" every
solution to the divison of performance risks and losses in the contract itself.
For purposes of this analysis, the principle characteristics of long-term
supply contracts may be summarized as (1) an assumption that ex ante plan-
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A number of distinctive features of long-term agreements
dictate avoidance of a mechanical application of the nonper-
formance doctrine. Long-term agreements often tend to be in-
complete in their coverage because they must attempt to define
obligations arising well into the future. Although the agree-
ment may contain a price escalation index, that index might it-
self be inadequate to take account of actual postcontract
inflation.51 The longer the period of time between contracting
and performance, the greater is the likelihood that time alone
will produce its own array of pricing risks.52 Moreover, neither
party will be able to predict all of the potential risks that might
develop during the life of the contract. The parties will view
most risks as unlikely, and even if they do anticipate an inter-
vening occurrence, they probably will not have appreciated the
full impact of that occurrence upon their ability to perform.53
Even when partial responsibility for an intervening occur-
rence can be attributed to one party to a long-term contract,
that party may not have been been able to avert the full effect
of that occurrence. An energy supply contract, for example,
may be disrupted by external events; the nature of the per-
formance obligation may constantly change in character; and
the effect of the disruption may be more disastrous than the
supplier had anticipated at the time of contracting.54 In addi-
ning will be inadequate; (2) reliance upon continuing ex post bargaining over
price, quantity, delivery, and related terms; (3) the mutual interdependence of
the parties; (4) the occurence of transaction costs when a relationship is termi-
nated; (5) the interest of dependent third parties and consumers in the con-
tinuity of the long-term relationship; and (6) the continuing risk of
government intrusions into the private domain.
51. This was precisely the opinion of the court in Aluminum Co. of Am. v.
Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980): "A remedy modifying the
price term of the contract in light of the circumstances which upset the price
formula will better preserve the purposes and expectations of the parties than
any other remedy. Such a remedy is essential to avoid injustice in this case."
Id. at 79.
52. A number of courts have discussed, without accepting, the notion that
courts should adjust prices more frequently. See McLouth Steel Corp. v. Jew-
ell Coal & Coke Co., 570 F.2d 594, 610 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 801
(1978); Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 135-36,
138-40 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415
F. Supp. 429, 432 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide
Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 989, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
53. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 989, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (foreseeability of 1973 oil crisis); Maple
Farms, Inc. v. City School District, 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 1081-82, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784,
786 (1974) (foreseeability of double-digit inflation).
54. See generally authorities cited supra notes 4, 9 & 46.
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tion, the parties, at the time of contracting, may have expected
to share the burden of intervening losses not regulated by the
contract. This is especially likely when neither party could be
faulted for causing the loss and when the losses involved might
otherwise lead to destruction of their long-term relationship.
Termination of a long-term relationship without modification
of the agreement also gives rise to dislocation and relocation
costs. "Exit" and "start up" costs elsewhere add to the transac-
tion costs that both parties usually must bear in reestablishing
their supply relationships with others.55
Losses that occur when an all-or-nothing doctrine is ap-
plied to long-term supply contracts also may have significant
spillover effects. Indirect parties to such agreements-employ-
ees, subcontractors, and agents, for example-may all benefit
economically from a contract modification that avoids the impo-
sition of undue economic hardship on a principal contractor on
whom they are dependent for their income.56
The rigid formalism of the all-or-nothing approach to im-
practicability must be avoided in long-term contract cases if
such functional agreements are to be encouraged in the future.
In reformulating a long-term contract for the supply of alu-
mina, the court in Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group,
Inc.57 aptly noted:
If the law refused an appropriate remedy when a prudently drafted
long term contract goes badly awry, the risks attending such contracts
would increase. Prudent business people would avoid using this sensi-
ble business tool. Or they would needlessly suffer the delay and ex-
pense of ever more detailed and sophisticated drafting in an attempt
to approximate by agreement what the law could readily furnish by
general rule.58
C. INTERPARTY SETTLEMENT
The independent or judicially motivated adjustment of con-
tract terms in continuous commercial relationships is a funda-
mental reality of modern business planning.59 Businesses are
55. See authorities cited supra note 46.
56. See Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Con-
tract Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979); supra notes 29 & 31.
57. 499 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
58. Id. at 89.
59. See L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA, A SocIAL AND Eco.
NOMIC CASE STUDY 193-94 (1965); Beale & Dugdale, Contracts Between Busi-
nessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRIT. J.L & SoclY
45, 52-59 (1975); Friedman, The Impact of Large Scale Business Enterprise on
Contract 7 INT'L ENCYL OF COMP. LAw 3, 9 (1973); Macaulay, Non-contractual
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constantly rearranging their affairs, both for their own conven-
ience and to maximize their relative share of market profits.
This "good faith" adjustment of losses is especially likely to oc-
cur in industries in which the members select their trade part-
ners on the basis of reciprocal need and where the parties
develop commercial "understandings" as to the manner of reg-
ulating risks.60 The ability of contractors, for example, to agree
on interim changes in the price or quantity of goods to be deliv-
ered reflects a realization that each of them will need to make
and receive concessions from time to time in order to continue
their association. 61 Moreover, the parties will appreciate that a
breakdown of trust between them may give rise to more than a
terminated relationship. Goodwill may be lost, morale may be
lowered, and the costs of cultivating alternative business as-
sociations are likely to increase. Indeed, the parties have a very
real incentive to determine their own division of losses and
thereby avoid the costs and risks associated with a judicially-
imposed allocation of liability.62
Courts often must rely on the parties to establish the na-
ture and extent of losses and to determine the manner in which
those losses should be apportioned. Interparty settlement is
one means by which courts may place primary reliance on the
parties. As authors of their own agreement, the disputants may
be "employed" to resolve their own disagreements.63 To facili-
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 60-62
(1963).
60. Professor Karl Llewellyn once observed that reciprocity in business is
most effective among contractors who have the benefit of "either permanence
of dealings involving long-run mutual dependence, or an ingrained traditional
morality on the point, or. . . [who interact] within a face-to-face community
in which severe group pressure on delinquent promisors is available." Llewel-
lyn, What Price Contract? An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 720
(1931).
61. See Phoenix Ins. Co. v. DeMonchy, [1929] 141 L.T.R. (n.s.) 439, 445; see
also H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF PRIVATE CONTRACT 67 (1961); Devlin,
The Relation Between Commercial Law and Commercial Practice, 14 MOD. L.
REV. 249, 249 (1951); Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the Man.
ufacturing Industry, 9 PRAC. LAW. 13, 14 (1963).
62. The respect that trade partners give to their undertakings will exist
only as long as they have reason to retain reasonable confidence in their mu-
tual compatability. Professor Harold C. Havighurst aptly suggested that the
relationship of such parties is most likely to fail when "the debtor is subject to
little competitive pressure," "where significant controversy develops," and
where "[e]vil men succeed in entering the circle of the trusted." See H. HAVIG.
HURST, supra note 61, at 74-76.
63. The advantages of pretrial settlement are various. At the pretrial
stage, the parties have not yet invested the substantial time and money re-
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tate interparty settlement, the court may stay proceedings for a
specified period of time to allow the parties the opportunity to
allocate performance losses between themselves. Judges can
formalize this agreement process by instructing the parties as
to the manner of settlement or by appointing masters to super-
vise that settlement.
The parties, of course, have strong incentives to settle per-
formance disputes on their own terms. Apart from the desire
to avoid the cost of litigating the dispute,64 parties may realize
that an adverse outcome could give rise to costs that outweigh
the utility of continuing with the litigation itself or that private
settlement may well be safer than risking an adverse judicial
imposition of full liability. The disputants may wish to avoid
litigation altogether; in many cases they may seek merely to
demonstrate to other trading partners that they are making a
"serious" claim.65 In such cases, the parties may be content to
allocate nonperformance losses between themselves by interim
agreement.
The success of loss-sharing by informal settlement in indi-
vidual cases depends on the complexity of the dispute and on
the willingness of the parties to engage in a good faith alloca-
tion of losses. Factors such as radical differences in the parties'
quired by trial, so they have an incentive to settle that diminishes as their "in-
vestment" in the trial increases. Interparty settlement, however, may be used
at any stage of the proceedings.
Judicial support for interparty settlement, whether pretrial or thereafter,
is borne out by the energy and inflation cases that followed the 1973 oil crisis.
In Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 911 (1980), for example, the district court took notice "of the number of
voluntary price adjustments entered into by other suppliers and buyers of
[uranium] yellowcake." Id. at 136. The district court noted further that
"[v]oluntary attempts at reaching equitable agreements and foregoing expen-
sive litigation should be encouraged." Id. In In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
Uranium Contracts Litigation, No. 235 (E.D. Va. Oct. 27, 1978), Judge
Mehrige, in a bench opinion, repeatedly stressed that the case "ought to end in
settlement," emphasizing the "court's availability, willingness and eagerness to
participate... in the settlement negotiatons."
64. Litigation may indeed be costly, time consuming, and wasteful. For
discussions of the massive litigation efforts involved in the Westinghouse ura-
nium litigation, see Eagan, The Westinghouse Uranium Contracts: Commer-
cial Impracticability and Related Matters, 18 Au. Bus. L.J. 281, 282-83 (1980);
Joskow, supra note 9, at 113.
65. This is perhaps the most telling explanation for pretrial settlement of
litigation. See generally M. ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EF-
FECtiVE JusTicE (1964); Clark, To an Understanding Use of Pre-trial, 29
F.R.D. 454 (1961); Clark, Objectives of Pre-trial Procedure, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 163
(1956); Pollock, Pretrial Conferences, 50 F.R.D. 451 (1970).
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views or a substantial difference in bargaining power may dis-
suade courts from encouraging informal settlement. In deter-
mining whether to promote informal settlement, courts
therefore should evaluate the ability of the parties to divide
performance losses by their own means in light of probable
transaction costs. In addition, courts should assess the extent to
which different forms of judicial supervision may inhibit or
promote the parties' own settlement efforts.
Interparty settlement may provide the most equitable
means of allocating losses from nonperformance. The parties
themselves are usually in a better position than courts to deter-
mine the extent to which they have each assumed, contractu-
ally or otherwise, particular business risks. Because they have
a more immediate understanding of the nature and extent of
their respective performance losses, the parties are also better
able to decide the manner in which to allocate their perform-
ance losses inter se. In addition, informed settlements may pro-
tect the business reputations of commercial parties and foster
their continuing business relationship.66
1. Judicial Supervision of Interparty Settlements
The judicial supervision of interparty settlement operates
at two distinct levels. Courts may provide the parties with in-
formation to guide their loss allocation, or the court may pre-
scribe the manner in which their settlement is to operate.
Judicial supervision may be advisory, as when the court ex-
plains to the parties what they should do to reach settlement,
or it may be prescriptive, as when the tribunal sets a method
that the parties are obliged to follow. Judicial supervision may
be institutionalized, for example, by appointing a special master
to direct the settlement, or it may be relatively noninstitution-
alized by permitting the parties to direct their own settlement
process.
Settlement instructions to the parties may include prelimi-
nary rulings relevant to the controversy. Courts, for example,
might delineate the elements of a total or a direct and proxi-
mate performance loss, or they may outline the constituent ele-
ments of the loss itself.67 In addition, courts may themselves
66. Implicit in this inquiry is an examination of the bargaining relation-
ship that exists between the parties, the duration of their past association, and
their potential for future interaction notwithstanding their immediate dispute.
67. Courts generally are willing to make such assessments. Those courts
that have "assessed" performance losses, however, have tended to impose full
[Vol. 69:471
COMMERCML IMPRACTICABILITY
allocate potentially disputed risks. A court may rule, for in-
stance, that a party is deemed to have foreseen particular risks
or to have assumed foreseeable risks to a stipulated degree.
Courts may also determine that a party could have avoided cer-
tain aspects of a risk by adopting precautionary measures or by
mitigating the effect of the ensuing loss. The court then may
direct the parties to reflect on the promisor's failure to avoid
that risk in dividing the resulting performance losses between
them.
Settlement "instructions" given to the parties in matters
affecting the public interest will often be subtle and indirect-
the parties may be "advised" that increases in the prices of par-
ticular goods might result in substantial public harm. Under
this approach, courts need not direct that the parties must set-
tle or settle in a particular manner. Rather, emphasis should
be placed on pointing up key factors that the parties should
consider in reaching their allocation of performance losses.
Courts may also advise that an unwillingness on the part of
one or both parties to settle in good faith or an attempt to sub-
vert the process of settlement in bad faith will result in speci-
fied penalties. The seriousness of these penalties may range
from a finding that the defaulting party must bear full respon-
sibility for the loss to a judicial readjustment of losses adverse
to the interests of the defaulting party.68
Courts are not always equipped to provide incontrovertible
liability for increments in the cost of performance on the promisor. See, e.g.,
Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283, 293 (7th Cir.
1974); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Cal-
laghan) 989, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co..
583 S.W.2d 721, 728 (Mo. Ct. App.), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979); Maple
Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 1086, 352 N.Y.S. 2d 784, 788
(1974).
68. The concept of "bad faith" in settlement is itself difficult to define in
the abstract. An unwillingness to settle does not by definition constitute bad
faith. Parties may avoid settling because they believe that their reasonable de-
mands are not being met, or because they consider their trade partner's de-
mands unreasonable. Whether holding such beliefs represents a "good faith"
reluctance to settle will depend upon the reasons underlying the belief, the
course of prior dealings between the parties, and the trade practices of persons
engaged in analogous types of negotiations and settlements. Evidence of "bad
faith" in settlement might consist of a persistent refusal to negotiate, an un-
willingness to make any offer of contribution toward the loss, or an outright
rejection of all offers presented by an opponent. For discussions of the limits
of good faith in adjusting contractual obligations, see Hillman, Policing Con-
tractual Modifications Under the U.CC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Eco-
nomic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REv. 849, 880-90 (1979); Muris, Opportunistic
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521, 552-72 (1981).
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directions to the parties. Judicial "incentives" to settle do not
assure private resolution. Contracting parties may still fail to
reach accord for any number of reasons. Linguistic, cultural, or
political barriers may impede prospects for settlement. Per-
sonal difficulties between the parties may reduce their effec-
tiveness in negotiating. The parties may overstate their
demands or underestimate their opponent's expectations, and
neither party may be willing to make necessary concessions.6 9
Instructions to the parties as to the division of performance
losses, however, can be fashioned to reduce the potential for
conflict in settlement negotiations. For example, the court may
identify particular disputed issues such as the total amount of
loss or the extent to which each party foresaw the risk of dis-
ruption, and it may then direct the parties as to the manner of
resolving their dispute.
The appointment of a special master may be the best de-
vice for resolution of such interparty settlement disagreements.
Special masters may be able to facilitate loss-sharing negotia-
tions70 when one or both of the parties are willing to negotiate
a loss-sharing formula but reach a point of deadlock, or when
one or both parties -are unwilling to discuss settlement without
the institutionalized supervision of a court. The special master
can be required to report to the court on the progress of the ne-
gotiations, on the difficulties encountered during the course of
those negotiations, and on the methods the master employed to
overcome those difficulties.71 The special master may also ex-
amine evidence relevant to the risk, assess the nature of the
69. On the "strategy" of bargaining as it affects negotiations and settle-
ments, see Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 281 (1956);
see also V. AUBERT, ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY 133 (1967); Eckhoff, The Media.
tor, the Judge and the Administrator in Conflict-Resolution, 10 Ac'rA SOCIO-
LOGICA 148 (1967).
70. Special masters have been appointed in several energy-related cases to
oversee negotiations and settlements. See Wall St. J., June 2, 1978, at 3, col. 1
(reporting appointment of special masters in Westinghouse uranium contract
litigation). The apparent success of the recent "Agent Orange" settlement was
attributed in some measure to the quality and skill of the appointed masters.
See Flaherty & Lauder, Inside Agent Orange, The 11th Hour Talks That Al-
most Failed, 6 Nat'l L.J. 1 (no. 37, 1984).
For discussions of the appointment of special masters generally, see Kauf-
man, Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 455-62
(1958); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part IL The American Analogue,
50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1325-29 (1975); Note, Masters and Magistrates in the
Federal Courts, 88 HARV. L. REV. 779, 780-96 (1975).
71. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c), (e).
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loss, and propose a loss-sharing formula.72
Although the appointment of a master does not ensure a
successful division of losses by extrajudicial settlement in all
cases,7 3 the use of special masters has proven especially effec-
tive in achieving settlements in certain identifiable categories of
commercial impracticability. In cases involving difficulties in
computing the division of losses, special masters with account-
ing expertise can help the parties arrive at a compromise fig-
ure. For example, an energy supplier seeking relief from its
contract because of an increase in the cost of performance may
produce accounting data to confirm the alleged economic loss.
That data, however, may reflect the artificial book value of a
loss or the improper depreciation of an asset. Such contriv-
ances may escape the attention of the ordinary court, but they
are more readily uncovered by expert special masters.
Interparty negotiations concerning the sharing of losses
often require complex damage calculations in which the notions
of fault, injury, and loss are inextricably interwoven.7 4 The
72. See FED. R Civ. P. 53(c)-(e); see also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2605-09, at 784-801 (1971 & Supp. 1984).
73. Not all courts perceive the appointment of a special master as a useful
practice. One court has observed that "more respect for the judgment of the
court arise[s] when the trial is by the judge." Adventures In Good Eating, Inc.
v. Best Places To Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 1942); see also La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256 (1957) (noting inefficient and excessive
use of special masters); Cheramie v. Orgeron, 434 F.2d 721, 722 (5th Cir. 1970)
(recalculation of damages necessary on remand because of master's error).
This concern over the efficiency of using special masters is especially evi-
dent in cases involving jury trials in which the master's findings represent
merely nonbinding evidence that may be disregarded by the jury. See FED. R.
Crv. P. 53(e)(3); cf. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478-79 (1962)
(assistance of master not needed by properly instructed jury); Tendler v. Jaffe,
203 F.2d 14, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 817 (1953) (noting danger
of invading jury's function); Eastern Fireproofing Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 50
F.RLD. 140, 142 (D. Mass. 1970) (report of master constitutes only prima facie
evidence that jury may disregard). Note, however, that in nonjury cases in
federal courts, the findings of the master must be accepted unless the findings
are clearly erroneous. FED. IL Civ. P. 53(e)(2).
Many of the problems associated with the use of special masters can be
avoided by appointing only qualified masters, by suitably prescribing their
terms of reference, and by requiring them to report and be accountable to the
court itself. Where necessary, masters can be instructed from time to time as
to the manner in which they should proceed, how they should examine wit-
nesses and their evidence, and in what time frame they must operate. See au-
thorities cited supra note 70.
74. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1957) (circum-
stances may warrant reference of detailed accounting to master); Crateo, Inc.
v. Intermark, Inc., 536 F.2d 862, 868 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976)
(use of special master to untangle complicated financial matters); Biechele v.
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master's expertise may be especially useful in distinguishing di-
rect from indirect damages and proximate from remote losses.
For example, disputes over increased costs of energy sources in
an inflationary era may reflect "exceptional conditions" war-
ranting the appointment of a special master. A qualified
master often may be better-equipped than courts to address
such complex issues as producer and consumer dependence on
energy or the availability of substitute sources of supply.
The appointment of a master, however, carries its own set
of particular risks. The master's ability to divide losses compe-
tently between the parties depends on more than the master's
expertise as an accountant, economist, or lawyer. The master
must also appreciate the dynamics that surround the settle-
ment process-the relationship between the parties, the nature
of their dispute, and the likely effect that the appointment will
have on their chances for settlement. The appointment of a
special master may itself impede interparty settlement and
cause delays, but this risk is not inherent in the appointment
itself. The ability of the master to motivate the parties toward
a consensual resolution of their dispute depends more on the
terms of appointment and the abilities of the individual master
than on any inherent strengths or weaknesses in the appoint-
ment process itself.
2. The Final Offer Rule
The final offer rule, a decision-making device seldom em-
ployed by courts, provides a potentially useful tool for loss allo-
cation in both contract and tort cases.75 Final offers have been
employed by professional sports negotiators to resolve salary
conflicts and the procedure is in noticeable use in labor arbitra-
Norfolk & W. Ry., 309 F. Supp. 354, 358-59 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (use of special
master to determine damages of over 700 plaintiffs); Foster v. City of Detroit,
254 F. Supp. 655, 668-70 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (use of special master to apply
court's damage formula in class action).
75. See generally P. FEUILLE, FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION (1975) (final of-
fer procedure in both public and private sector); J. STERN, C. REHMIS, J. LOEW-
ENBERG, H. KASPER & B. DENNIS, FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION (1975)
(discussing effects of final offer labor settlement) [hereinafter cited as FINAL
OFFER ARBITRATION]; Long & Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration: "Sudden
Death" in Eugene, 27 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 186 (1974) (discussing public
employee contract dispute resolution under Oregon law); Seplowitz, Final Of-
fer Arbitration: The Last Word in Public Sector Labor Disputes, 10 CoLuM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 525 (1974) (comparing Michigan and Oregon final offer
statutes); Zack, Final Offer Selection-Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 19 N.Y.L.F.
567 (1974) (final offer selection in public employee bargaining).
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tion matters.76 Final offer arbitration in judicial proceedings
may begin with the court's request to the parties to enter into
negotiations, with or without a supervising master. At the end
of these negotiations, each party decides the amount of its final
offer as a contribution toward the total loss. The court may re-
quire that each final offer be supplemented by a statement ex-
plaining the reasons for the figures chosen. Once a party's final
offer of contribution has been accepted by the court, the other
party is held responsible to contribute the balance of the total
loss. As a general rule, the decision maker is required to make
an award on the basis of one of the two final offers submitted.
The tribunal cannot reject both final offers, because to do so
would presumably undermine the integrity of each party's con-
tribution toward the loss. Conversely, by compelling the court
to accept at least one of the "last offers," each party is given an
incentive to avoid making a final offer that would be rejected
by the court in favor of the more reasonable final offer ten-
dered by the other party.7 7
. The last offer approach does present risks to the negotiat-
ing parties. First, there is the possibility that one or both of the
parties may offer an unreasonably small amount. In such a
case, the court would accept the more "reasonable" offer and
thereby impose upon the lower offeror the balance of the loss.78
As noted above, however, the parties' awareness of this risk it-
self encourages the parties to make reasonable final offers. At
the other extreme is the risk that each party, fearful of being
held responsible for the bulk of the loss, will be tempted to sec-
ond-guess the court and offer exactly what it believes the court
76. On final offer arbitration in sports, particularly in salary negotiations
in baseball, see Seitz, Footnotes to Baseball Salary Arbitration, 29 ARB. J. 98,
99-103 (1974); Staudohar, Player Salary Issues in Major League Baseball, 33
ARB. J. 17, 19-20 (1978). For discussions of the use of final offer arbitration in
labor-management negotiations, see P. FEUILLE, supra note 75; Grodin, Either-
or Arbitration for Public Employee Disputes, 11 INDUS. REL_ 260. 260-66 (1972);
Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?, 5 INDUS.
REL. 38, 45-47 (Feb. 1966).
77. Final offer arbitration assumes various forms in practice. Different
states and municipalities employ their own particular final offer schemes. See,
e.g., MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 423.233-9 (West 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 34:13A-16 (West Supp. 1984); see also Holden, Final-Offer Arbitration in
Massachusetts: One Year Later, 31 ARB. J. 26, 26-28 (1976); Long & Feuille,
supra note 75, at 191-92 (Oregon law); Weitzman & Stochaj, Attitudes of Arbi-
trators Towards Final Offer Arbitration in New Jersey, 35 ARB. J. 25, 26-27
(1980).
78. This risk in final offer arbitration is echoed repeatedly in the litera-
ture. See authorities cited supra notes 76-77.
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will require that party to contribute. This risk is not harmful,
however, so long as the parties anticipate that the court will
make a rational and objective choice. Yet another risk may be
that each party will make a mechanical offer to assume fifty
percent of the loss. This risk, however, is counterbalanced by
the realization that both parties will not invariably take this ap-
proach-one party may be risk averse whereas the other may
be favorably disposed toward risk taking. Finally, one or both
parties may decline to present a last offer of contribution to the
loss at all. A party who fails to make any offer takes the
chance that the court will accept the opposing party's last offer.
If neither party presents a final offer, both parties assume the
risk that the court will impose its own division of the loss upon
them.79
Final offer resolution can be an effective means of imple-
menting a loss sharing scheme, especially in long-term install-
ment sales and supply agreements. Final offer arbitration
would be most useful when both parties are sufficiently sophis-
ticated to appreciate the economic risks and losses at issue and
are able to identify the manner in which a tribunal would
likely allocate responsibility for those risks and losses. The
parties can then evaluate their positions realistically against the
standards employed by courts.8 0 Final offer resolution may also
tend to be more successful in situations that permit a number
of possible solutions rather than a single all-or-nothing result.
Parties faced with an all-or-nothing judicial allocation of loss
have every incentive to embellish their claims in the hope of
79. Both parties likely will present final offers that they are able to sub-
stantiate in good faith when the risk of not making such offers leads to the
court's adoption of an alternative offer of contribution. Parties who are re-
quired to present reasons for their final offers also would be discouraged from
adopting a mechanical or arbitrary allocation of performance losses, because
the court may expect them either to explain the nature and form of their pro-
posed division of losses or risk the rejection of their final offer.
80. See ASSEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
IN CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT 226 (March 15, 1973), quoted in Zack, supra
note 75, at 577. It is interesting to note that in the baseball disputes resolved
by final offer arbitration, baseball clubs have been far more successful than
the players in having their final offers accepted by arbitrators. This phenome-
non may be attributed in part to the superior sophistication and skill of clubs
in predicting what arbitrators likely would accept as a last bid. There is no
assurance, however, that such "gaps" in knowledge are necessarily lasting, es-
pecially given the increasing negotiating sophistication of players and their
agents. See Fishman & Potter, Pinch-Hitting for Baseball's Present System-
Impartial Arbitration as a Method of Dispute Resolution, 14 U.C.D. L. REV.
691, 707 n.100 (1981).
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being the winner who takes all. Conversely, parties who expect
to share in the loss are more likely to make final offers along a
spectrum of possibilities because they have alternative offers of
contribution from which to choose.
The final offer technique also is likely to be more efficient
than judicial allocation of performance losses in multi-issue dis-
putes. Courts often lack the information necessary to identify
and balance complex performance losses. The parties them-
selves, on the other hand, frequently are able to base their last
offers on a calculated assessment of and a conciliation among
interrelated commercial concerns that lie outside the judicial
purview.8 ' Undoubtedly, allocation of loss by final offer resolu-
tion-may encourage undesirable gamesmanship.82 Judges may
also consider themselves "confronted with two unpalatable last
best offers."83 These criticisms, however, are directed to the
method of final offer dispute resolution, not to the concept of
final offer arbitration itself. In adopting the final offer ap-
proach, the court does not delegate decision-making power to
the parties; it merely permits the parties to act as advocates for
their own preferred methods of loss allocation. The division of
loss ultimately chosen is one that the court itself makes on the
basis of the competing offers presented by the parties.84
Although judges often are reluctant to adjust losses themselves,
they are nevertheless capable of recognizing unrealistic and ex-
aggerated last offers, and they may require the parties to give
reasons for their final offers or to seek the assistance of expert
assessors. Moreover, when the final offer method is invoked,
the judge is not forced to "remake" the parties' contract
through a process of judicial conjecture or ex post speculation
as to how the parties might have allocated the risk of loss had
they contemplated that risk at the time of contracting. Instead,
the final offer rule encourages the parties to present their own
81. Such "multi-issue" disputes are often described as "polycentric." See
M. PoLANYi, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS AND REJOINDERS 170-84
(1951); Note, Final Offer Arbitration: A Pre-Trial Settlement Device, 16 HARV.
J. ON LEGis. 513, 525 (1979).
82. See Weitzman & Stochaj, supra note 77, at 27.
83. Id. This critical position is sometimes forcefully advocated. "[Final of-
fer arbitration] is the hydrogen bomb poised above the bargaining table whose
very terror should assure its nonuse." ASSEMBLY ADVISORY COUNCIL ON PUB.
LIC RELATIONS IN CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT 226 (March 15, 1973), quoted in
Zack, supra note 75, at 577.
84. Final offer arbitration is usually construed as a pretrial procedure that
may avoid the need for a trial. A jury trial, however, is still constitutionally
guaranteed. See Note, supra note 81, at 537.
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proposed allocation of loss for the court to apply.85
D. JUDICIAL ADJUSTMENTS OF PERFORMANCE LOSSES
1. Methods of Judicial Adjustments
Not even the most conscientiously conducted or supervised
negotiations always result in settlement. Judicial allocation of
performance losses is therefore inevitable in some cases. When
the parties are unlikely to reach a mutually agreeable settle-
ment, or when the court considers itself better able than the
parties to divide the loss, the court should take it upon itself to
adjust performance losses.86 In addition, when the court is un-
able to facilitate a settlement through the use of a special
master or by application of the final offer rule, it should order a
loss-sharing arrangement between the parties. Judicial loss-
sharing arrangements also should be imposed when the parties
are unlikely to maintain a harmonious and ongoing relationship
in their own settlement negotiations.8 7
Once judicial adjustment becomes necessary, the court
must determine how it should go about dividing performance
losses between the parties. One approach is to adjust perform-
85. See supra text accompanying notes 13-24. A judge who invites com-
peting offers of contribution does not delegate decision-making power. Ulti-
mately the court, not the individual contractor, decides whether to adopt the
final offer method, how to institute that method, and what weight to attach to
each last offer. In this way, the court combines its roles as mediator and
adjudicator.
86. The utility of a judicial allocation of performance losses depends in
large part on the nature of the parties' relationship, the complexity of the
transaction in issue, and the extent of the loss sustained. For example, courts
may need to adjust losses in situations in which one party is able to employ its
superior position to secure an unconscionable adjustment in performance if
the judicial supervision of the settlement process is unlikely to alter such a re-
sult. Superior bargaining power alone, however, is not sufficient to justify the
displacement of interparty settlement. The Uniform Commercial Code prop-
erly emphasizes that "the principle [of unconscionability] is one of the preven-
tion of oppression and unfair surprise. . . and not of disturbance of allocation
of risks because of superior bargaining power." U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1.
87. The usefulness of judicial allocations of performance losses will also
depend on such interpersonal factors as the degree of animosity or amicability
existing between the parties and the extent to which both parties are willing
to discuss their differences. A party may favor judicial adjustment because it
hopes to do better by judgment than by settlement, because it mistrusts the
other party's willingness to negotiate a settlement, or because one or both of
the parties mistrust the process of settlement. In these situations, a judicial
adjustment of losses may be necessary even though settlement may be reason-
ably possible or even though the party refusing to settle may do so in bad
faith. The court may impose a greater share of the loss upon a party whom it
considers to be acting in "bad faith," but it cannot decline to settle the matter.
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ance losses only insofar as that adjustment is embodied in the
contract itself or in the trade practices of the parties. Absent a
price, quality, or quantity adjustment clause in the contract, the
court, under this approach, would hold that the promisor as-
sumed the risks of nonperformance. Any judicial adjustment of
loss that extends beyond the confines of the agreement impairs
the ex ante bargain and imposes an unjustifiable and inefficient
ex-post adjustment of losses upon the parties.8 8 Had the parties
wished their agreement to have been otherwise, they presuma-
bly would have written it to that effect.8 9
This narrow view of adjustment assumes that the ex ante
allocation of risk by the parties is the most efficient method of
adjustment. It presupposes that those parties who do divide
performance risks in their agreement do so with reasonable
knowledge of the nature and extent of the contemplated risks.
Ex ante efficiency, however, may tend to diminish when uncon-
templated risks materialize after the date of contracting, when
transaction costs have expanded significantly, or when the costs
of interparty settlement exceed the benefit of maintaining a
continued relationship. The inability of the parties to agree
later on an adjustment of losses may itself demonstrate that
they did not reasonably contemplate that risk of loss in their ex
ante allocation of performance risks. The risk of inflated costs
of production, for example, may have been anticipated at the
time of contracting-both parties may have bargained over
whether to "cover" such a contingency-but neither party may
have considered cost inflation to be a significant risk, and
88. See Speidel, supra note 3, at 393-94. Professor Richard E. Speidel con-
tends that "the judicial readjustment of so-called 'undeserved' gains and losses
[those not allocated by contract] has a 'zero sum' quality." The effect will be
to "redistribute without generating new wealth." See id. at 393. "[S]ince the
reallocation is not based upon a voluntary transaction," Speidel states, "there
is no presumption that a net increase in efficiency will result." id at 394.
89. In Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D.
Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 911 (1980), the district court, discussing U.C.C. § 2-209, observed:
'That section contemplates modification emanating from 'good faith' bargain-
ing between merchants .... It does not undertake to give the court a role in
imposing an adjustment." Id at 139. In Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group,
Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), the court commented that "[j]udges are
seldom able businessmen; they seldom have the information, ability, or time to
do a good job of contracting for the parties." Id. at 91. The court, however,
also stated that "[t]he parties may be better served by an informed judicial de-
cision based on known circumstances than by a decision wrenched from words
of the contract which were not chosen with a prevision of today's circum-
stances." Id.
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neither may have appreciated fully its degree of devastation.go
Alternatively, both parties may have allocated performance
risks efficiently at the time of contracting, but that allocation
may become economically inefficient when market dynamics
have altered the context that surrounded their bargain.91
An alternative method of loss allocation would be to divide
performance losses on the basis of the relative ability of each
party to sustain the loss. Under this approach, a court faced
with an impracticability case arising out of the 1956 Suez Canal
blockage, for example, would have required the party who was
better able to incur the added expense of shipping goods via the
Cape of Good Hope to assume the greater proportion of the loss
resulting from the blockade. This determination, however, is
not always evident. One commentator on the Suez cases sug-
gested that the buyer, not the seller, should have assumed the
bulk of the losses because the blockage caused the goods af-
fected to become more scarce, resulting in an increase in the
price of the goods at the place of delivery. The buyers, there-
fore, could have resold the goods at inflated prices.92 The in-
crease in market price at a particular place of delivery,
however, does not mean necessarily that all buyers benefit
from a delay in delivery. Buyers often face severe transaction
costs precisely because there is a delay in delivery-sub-
purchasers may cancel orders or sue buyers for nondelivery,
and buyers may have no readily accessible alternative source of
goods to sell at the inflated ex post prices.93 Moreover, in a
competitive market the supplier's nonperformance may not
provide the promisee-buyer with a more highly valued com-
modity because the nonperformance of a single supplier will
not alter seriously either market supply or market demand.94
90. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. Speidel, a strong propo-
nent of interparty loss allocation, nevertheless admits that interparty settle-
ment is suspect when "at the time of contracting [there is] inadequate
information about the future." See Speidel, supra note 3, at 398.
91. See Speidel, supra note 3, at 398; see also Horwitz, Law and Econom-
ics: Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980); Kelman, Choice and
Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 769; Michelman, A Comment on Some Uses and
Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 307 (1979); Schwartz, Econom-
ics, Wealth Distribution, and Justice, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 799.
92. See Birmingham, supra note 31, at 1412-15.
93. Whether a particular buyer has faced these problems is inevitably a
question of fact; however, to assume that buyers generally are able to offset
short supplies with readily available substitutes and then resell the latter for a
profit in the marketplace is too general an assumption to be imputed to a het-
erogeneous body of buyers and sellers engaged in conventional trade.
94. For discussions of the effects of perfect and imperfect market competi-
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The premise that loss sharing should be based entirely on
which party happens to be better able to bear the financial bur-
den of a loss is itself questionable. The ability of a party to sus-
tain a loss must be balanced in the first instance against that
party's ability to prevent the loss from occurring at all. To
maintain otherwise would be to discourage parties from taking
precautions against the disruption of their performance.
In allocating performance losses, a court may seek to deter-
mine the ability of each party to foresee and plan for the risk of
loss. One commentator has proposed that in situations involv-
ing "archetypical" contracts, the promisor should be assumed to
have had significant control over most performance risks. The
failure of such a promisor to manage those risks properly
would result in its primary responsibility for ensuing losses.
Conversely, in situations involving "nonarchetypical" contracts,
the promisor is presumed to lack such risk awareness and bar-
gaining skill and should therefore be less responsible for mis-
managing the risk of performance loss.95 The problem with
this proposal, however, is that parties to archetypical contracts,
even if such contracts can be identified and neatly classified as
"archetypical," are unlikely to be uniformly capable of manag-
ing their own performance risks. An energy supplier who is
highly sophisticated in risk management, for example, may be
only partially capable of managing the risk of any number of
unforeseen contingencies, such as sudden oil embargoes or ac-
celerations in the rate of inflation. The justification for any
method of loss sharing ultimately must be founded on more
than the mere stereotypical characterization of the parties'
agreement.
One solution is to require that both parties share equally in
performance losses when neither party could have avoided
either the occurrence of those losses or their harmful conse-
quences. This fifty-fifty loss sharing principle has been advo-
cated as a possible statutory formula for loss allocation on the
assumption that "only innocent parties will bear losses result-
tion, see E. MANSFIELD; MONOPOLY, POWER AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE:
THE PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 18 (4th ed. 1974); R. POSNER.
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7-8, 58-199 (1977).
95. Schlegel, supra note 4, at 447-48. Professor John H. Schlegel postu-
lates that "contracts should be enforced only when the contract... is essen-
tially similar to the archetypical contract ... between brokers." Id. at 447. In
nonarchetypical contracts, on the other hand, "essential reliance damages...
as well as the costs of any partial performance should be split between the
parties." Id.
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ing from a contract discharged as burdensome, and ... equita-
ble considerations ... suggest that at least some ... losses...
should be evenly shared."96 This proposal, however, has several
weaknesses. It provides an inflexible middle line, operating be-
tween the two extremes of all or nothing. Although perhaps
more equitable than the approaches considered previously, this
approach fails to provide a rational framework for loss alloca-
tion. The basic assumption that both parties are equally "inno-
cent" in causing the loss is itself suspect. Contractors who are
"risk managers" usually should assume a greater share of re-
sponsibility for the "managed" risk of harm, even though the
source of that harm may have been beyond their "control." A
purchaser and a supplier, for example, are not equally "inno-
cent" when the supplier was primarily responsible for planning
for the inflation risk by stockpiling inventories, diversifying
sources of supply, or altering production techniques. Parties
who are not equally innocent should not be required to bear an
equal share of performance losses.
Allocating losses in a manner that the court deems "just
and reasonable" avoids the mechanical features of an equal loss
split. Such an approach, however, leaves unanswered two fun-
damental questions: what is a "just and reasonable" allocation
of losses, and what methodology should guide the judge in mak-
ing that determination? The United Kingdom's Law Reform
(Frustrated Contracts) Act provides only limited guidance.97
Under that Act, the court is empowered to divide down pay-
ments made and expenses incurred by each of the parties prior
to frustration if the court considers it "just to do so having re-
gard to all the circumstances of the case."9 8 Particular circum-
stances that the court may consider are "the amount of any
expenses incurred before the time of discharge by the benefited
party" and "the effect, in relation to the said benefit, of the cir-
cumstances giving rise to the frustration of the contract."Do
How these "circumstances" are to be evaluated and what effect
they are to have in light of "all the circumstances of the case"
is left for the judge to decide.100 Because of the absence of
meaningful guidelines as to what constitutes a "just and reason-
able" division of losses, courts in the Uilited Kingdom have
96. Comment, supra note 37, at 1058-59; see also Comment, Loss Splitting
in Contract Litigation, 18 U. CHi. L. REV. 153 (1950).
97. See supra notes 36-37.
98. 6 & 7 GEO. IV, c. 40, §§ 1(2), (3) (1943).
99. Id. §§ 1(3)(a), (b).
100. Id. § 1(3).
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made little use of the Act.101
American courts face similar problems in establishing a
"just" distribution of performance losses. The parties could, for
example, be required to share only in their reliance expenses
or, alternatively, they could be ordered to split their expecta-
tion losses.02 American courts have tended to favor the reli-
ance expenses approach;103 however, the reliance notion itself
may be comparatively valueless when the subject matter of the
contract has been destroyed, as when a ship carrying the goods
has sunk, or when the goods or services have diminished in
value in times of recession. Moreover, dividing only reliance
expenses often is inadequate because it fails to recompense the
parties for their capital expenditures. A purchaser of uranium,
for example, may incur considerable capital improvement costs
in expectation of continuous supplies of uranium from a partic-
ular supplier. These costs increase when the purchaser is un-
able to adapt the capital expenditures to alternative uses. 0 4
Furthermore, merely restoring the parties to the positions they
would have occupied had there been no contract may under-
mine the parties' ongoing association.105 Commercial contrac-
tors often are more concerned with maintaining than with
101. See authorities cited supra note 36. The Frustrated Contracts Act re-
cently has been resurrected in B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Hunt, [1979] 1
W.L.R. 783, [1981] 1 W.L.R. 232 (C.A.). Discussions of this case include Baker,
Frustration and Unjust Enrichment, 38 CAiM. L.J. 266 (1979); Dawson, Judi-
cial Review of Frustrated Contracts, 1982 JURID. REV. 86; Rose, Restitution
and Frustration, 131 NEW L.J. 955 (1981).
102. See J. DAWSON & W. HARVEY, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CONTRACTS
90 (1977); M G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 13 (1978).
103. Courts frequently emphasize that the sharing of reliance losses is nec-
essary to avoid unjust enrichment. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United
States, 363 F.2d 312, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("If the performance rendered has
value, recovery in quantum meruit for the entire performance is proper."). In
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980),
the court, commenting on McMahan v. Terkhorn, 67 Ind. App. 501, 116 N.E.
327 (1917), observed that "[i]n a fully executed contract, a price adjustment
was necessary to protect the fair expectation of the parties and to prevent un-
just enrichment." 499 F. Supp. at 79; see also RESTATMiENT (SECOND) OF CON.
TRACTS § 261 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS introductory note,
at 43-44 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1974) ("In some cases a party who has already
partly performed is entitled to recovery for what he has done under the rule
on part performances as agreed equivalents .... Even where this is not so,
relief may be available in the form of a claim for restitution or expenses in-
curred in reliance on the contract. .. ").
104. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 81-89
(W.D. Pa. 1980).
105. This is especially the case in so-called "relational" business ventures.
See supra notes 49-50.
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terminating their obligations notwithstanding performance
disruptions.
2. A New Methodology
Each of the loss-sharing methods considered previously has
at least some strengths. Mechanical methods of loss sharing,
such as equal apportionment of performance losses, provide
certainty of result. Loss sharing based on judicial discretion
promotes flexibility both in method and result. Dividing losses
on the basis of each party's relative fault in causing the loss or
injury arising from the disruption takes account of the degree
of fault or injury involved in the dispute. Yet no one method of
loss sharing satisfies the needs of every case; each method fo-
cuses only upon one relevant consideration in the allocation of
performance losses. This section proposes a general methodol-
ogy for the allocation of performance risks and ensuing losses
between contractors. 0 6
As a general principle, each party should assume responsi-
bility only for that proportion of performance risks and ensuing
losses that are within its "control." This general principle re-
quires that each party take precautions against those risks asso-
106. The following sets out the framework of principles on which the pro-
posed methodology is founded:
1. A party assumes responsibility for that proportion of performance
risks and ensuing losses that are within that party's "control."
a. "Control" over performance arises when a contractor,
through self-management or insurance, is better able than a co-
contractor (1) to contemplate both the advent of the risk that in-
tervened and its probable effect upon performance, and (2) to
avert or mitigate the performance losses produced by that per-
formance risk.
b. The proportions in which each party shares in performance
losses shall be adjusted further so that a greater proportion of the
loss under principle I above is imposed upon (1) a party who in
the opinion of the court and on a reasoned assessment of the evi-
dence has failed to provide a cocontractor with adequate notice or
other assistance necessary for the fulfillment of their respective
performance obligations; (2) a party who in the opinion of the
court and on an examination of the party's conduct has demon-
strated bad faith in settling or in declining to settle, and (3) a
party whose assumption of the risk of loss will, on a study of com-
peting social interests, likely minimize public harm and maximize
economic efficiency.
2. In calculating each party's proportionate responsiblity for the loss,
the court shall evaluate the type of parties, contract, and dispute in
issue, emphasizing in particular the "transactional" or "relational"
character of the agreement, the source of disagreement between the
parties, and the likely effect of the court's allocation of performance
losses upon future interparty relations.
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ciated with its performance. The supplier usually assumes
responsibility for supply-related risks, and the purchaser nor-
mally assumes responsibility for purchase-related risks.O7 A
seller in a supply contract would be expected to manage pro-
duction problems because it is often in a position to streamline
factory operations, to maintain efficiency in production, and to
procure production insurance.lOS The purchaser is similarly ex-
pected to manage such purchase-related risks as the inability to
pay for the goods on delivery, because the purchaser should
have secured credit or insurance to ensure payment.
Application of this general principle results in fair and eco-
nomically sensible decisions in most cases. In the commercial
context, the promisor-supplier typically will be the superior
risk bearer because performance disruptions usually are caused
by a dislocation of supplies.109 Assigning the risk of nonper-
formance to the promisor-supplier can be expected to yield sat-
isfactory results.11O An energy purchaser, in contrast, cannot
fairly or economically be expected to manage its supplier's
workforce or production facility. Such activities are more suita-
bly reserved to the supplier. Similarly, an energy supplier is
usually better able than a purchaser to provide for inflation in
the cost of supplies by stockpiling energy reserves, by negotiat-
ing substitute supply contracts, or by canvassing alternative en-
ergy producers. Conversely, an energy purchaser can be
expected to manage such purchase-related risks as the inability
to sell the goods ordered to third parties at the inflated price
and the incapacity to diversify capital costs incurred as a result
107. See supra note 67 and accompanying text; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 563 F.2d 588, 597-602 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434
U.S. 1062, cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 911 (1978); Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth
Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp. 245, 247 (N.D. IMI. 1974), affd, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir.
1975). Judge Richard A. Posner and Andrew W. Rosenfield describe the party
who is better able to "control" the risk of loss (usually the promisor) as the
"superior risk bearer." See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 29, at 90-92, 110-
11.
108. Risk insurance has been relied on heavily by suppliers faced with
political and economic risks. See Uttal, Life is Getting Scary in the Oil Mar-
kets, FORTUNE, Jan. 28, 1980, at 54, 56.
109. See supra notes 67 & 107.
110. Assigning the risk to the promisor-supplier also may be justified by
the fact that promisees generally are unable to manage risks that are within
the promisor's reasonable control. Professor Paul L. Joskow suggests that
"[t]o provide otherwise might lead to an increase in opportunistic behavior or
encourage inefficient risk-taking behavior on the part of the promisor." Jos-
kow, supra note 9, at 155.
1985]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of cost inflation."' In cases in which a promisor-supplier is not
the superior risk bearer, the general principle may be
rebutted.112
The rebuttable presumption that promisors are usually bet-
ter able than promisees to manage their own performance risks
is widely canvassed in judicial opinions. For example, in Trans-
atlantic Financing Corp. v. United States,"3 the court required
the shipper to assume the risk of transporting wheat from the
United States to Iran, notwithstanding the blockage of the Suez
Canal in 1956:
[I]t is more reasonable to expect owner-operators of vessels [rather
than their customers] to insure against the hazards of war. They are
in the best position to calculate the cost of performance by alternative
routes (and therefore to estimate the amount of insurance required),
111. The risk that purchasers will incur extensive expectation costs is espe-
cially evident when purchasers under long-term contracts design their facili-
ties around the products of their particular suppliers. Such situations are not
unlikely in an age in which commercial interdependence stems from a need
for technological compatability. See generally cases cited supra note 67.
112. Many performance losses caused by intervening events arise without
the fault of the promisor, yet the promisor still may be held responsible for
the ensuing loss. For example, in Jennie-O Foods, Inc. v. United States, 580
F.2d 400, 410 (Ct. Cl. 1978), a supplier that failed to provide the United States
with a promised flock of turkeys was denied an excuse from performance,
notwithstanding the fact that its producer's supply of turkeys had been de-
pleted by disease. The court reasoned that although the promisor did not
cause the loss, it conceivably could have obtained turkeys from alternative
sources of supply. The supplier was better able economically than the govern-
ment to control the risk of shortages in supply. For cases reaching similar re-
sults, see Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc., 600 F.2d
103, 112 (7th Cir. 1979) (supplier failed to show unavailability of alternative
sources of scrap iron supply); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 563
F.2d 588, 601 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062, cert. dismissed, 435 U.S.
911 (1978) (supplier's inability to acquire offshore oil leases does not excuse
performance); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283,
294 (7th Cir. 1974) (no excuse when alternative supply available, albeit in ex-
cess of contract price); Chemetron Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 381 F. Supp.
245, 257 (N.D. Ill. 1974), affd, 522 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1975) (seller must employ
any practicable alternative means to fulfill the contract); Heat Exchangers,
Inc. v. Map Constr. Corp., 34 Md. App. 679, 689-90, 368 A.2d 1088, 1094-95
(1977) (failure of seller to deliver not excused by inability to obtain component
parts from suppliers); Center Garment Co. v. United Refrigerator Co., 369
Mass. 633, 637-38, 341 N.E.2d 669, 672-73 (1976) (promisor not excused from
contract to supply acetate after its supplier failed to perform); Canadian Indus.
Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 199-200, 179 N.E. 383, 384-85
(1932) (molasses supplier not excused by refinery's inability to fill its order);
Deardorff-Jackson Co. v. National Produce Distrib., Inc., 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1164, 1166-67 (U.S. Dep't Agric. 1967) (seller of potatoes not ex-
cused when it failed to take adequate steps to ensure its source of supply
would not fail).
113. 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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and. are undoubtedly sensitive to international troubles which
uniquely affect the demand for and cost of their services 11 4
Several practical reasons dictate that promisors ordinarily
should be deemed to be the managers of their own perform-
ances. As the Transatlantic court noted, the promisor typically
is better able to avert the intervening harm because it has
greater access than the promisee to information about the po-
tential disruption. The energy seller in a long-term supply con-
tract generally has greater "access" than the promisee to
information concerning such supply-related risks as labor un-
rest, shortages of raw materials, and the shutdown of oil refin-
eries.11 5 Unlike the supplier in Transatlantic, a promisor may
provide for an adjustment of performance losses in the contract
itself. In such cases, courts will likely hold that if other disrup-
tive circumstances do arise, the promisor is nonetheless obli-
gated to perform without adjustment.U6 A contractor who
undertakes to perform subject to specified conditions is nor-
mally expected to bear the risk of loss in those circumstances
not covered by the contract.1 1 7
The general principle that parties should be responsible for
risks within their control seeks to encourage promisors to exer-
cise sound risk management. Courts, of course, should not
lightly excuse performance obligations. To substantially relieve
suppliers from their responsibility to perform is to discourage
those suppliers from addressing risk contingencies such as price
hikes and supply shortages.18 To excuse by law the party who
114. Id. at 319.
115. In Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D.
Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert denied,
445 U.S. 911 (1980), the court declined to excuse defendant Atlas from a ura-
nium-supply contract, stating:
It would be unfair to expect Atlas to have prophesied the magnitude
of the increases complained of, but it is not clear that it was not in a
position to protect itself contractually from some of the risks which
would drive the price of yellowcake [uranium] up and consequently
affect the cost of production.
Id. at 135; see also cases cited supra note 67.
116. The promisor should not, however, be required to bear the risk of loss
when the parties' prior course of dealing or the commercial usage in the trade
require otherwise and when the "contemplation" or "mitigation" tests that de-
fine "control" are met. See infra text accompanying notes 120-28. The prom-
isor also should not be responsible for performance risks if its trade partner
acted in bad faith or failed to give notice of impracticability. See infra text ac-
companying notes 129-38. Competing social interests may also relieve the
promisor. See infra text accompanying notes 139-4L
117. See cases cited supra note 112.
118. Encouraging supplier foresight is a major policy concern underlying
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is better able to manage performance risks also would likely in-
crease potential transaction costs because parties faced with
such judicial "modifications" of their contracts will seek to
reformulate conditions of performance in future transactions to
resurrect their status quo.119 Application of the proposed gen-
eral principle should avoid this future reformulation.
In applying the general principle, courts should define con-
trol with reference to the ability of each party to contemplate
the possibility and effects of an intervening risk. Contempla-
tion of a risk of harm, however, does not serve as the sole de-
terminant of a contractor's ability to "control" performance.120
A contractor may foresee a war, a storm, or spiralling inflation
and yet still be unable to provide adequately for that contin-
gency by contract. As the Transatlantic court noted, "Parties
to a contract are not always able to provide for all the possibili-
ties of which they are aware, sometimes because they cannot
agree, often simply because they are too busy."121 Even the
most experienced contracting parties will not foresee all of the
possible contingencies that may develop, and those that are an-
ticipated may be addressed in the contract only selectively or,
even worse, in the unclear terms that often result from
the development of the "assumption of risk" doctrine in relation to perform-
ance. See supra note 13 and cases cited supra notes 17-18.
119. See Joskow, supra note 9, at 156-57.
120. Regrettably, a substantial body of case law holds that the promisor's
ability to foresee disruptions in performance constitutes prima facie evidence
of an ability to "control" the risk. See, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v.
Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 134-35 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Eastern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 441-42 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Lloyd v.
Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 54-56, 153 P.2d 47, 50-51 (1944); Missouri Pub. Serv. Co.
v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 725-28 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 865 (1979). The extent to which a lack of foresight is required for relief
under the UCC is unclear. Comment 4 to § 2-615 requires the presence of
"some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the per-
formance." Comment 8 to § 2-615 notes that before relief from performance
will be denied, the contingency causing the increased burden should be suffi-
ciently foreseeable "to be included among the business risks which are fairly
to be regarded as part of the dickered terms" of the agreement. Comment 4
appears to elevate foresight to an essential component in determining whether
the "essential nature of performance" has been altered, whereas comment 8
identifies foresight with the "dickered terms" of the contract. Both of these
postulations arguably overstate the role of a contemplation test. See infra text
accompanying notes 126-28; see also Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v.
Loverde, 70 Cal. 2d 666, 676-77 n.13, 451 P.2d 721, 728 n.13, 75 Cal. Rptr. 889,
896 n.13 (1969) ("[T]he question whether a risk was foreseeable is quite distinct
from the question whether it was contemplated by the parties.").
121. 363 F.2d at 318.
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compromise.122
A contractor's anticipation of an intervening risk does not
require that it necessarily take responsibility for its occurrence.
As the Transatlantic court noted, "that some abnormal risk
was contemplated is probative but does not necessarily estab-
lish an allocation of the risk of the contingency which actually
occurs."123 A pronisor may foresee a risk as a vague possibility,
not as a probability, and it may not contemplate the extent of
the injury actually caused by that contingency.
Even a party who foresees harm does not necessarily have
a superior capacity to avoid that harm. The other party may be
equally capable of foreseeing the risk of harm and be better
able to avert its consequences. A domestic exporter of an indig-
enous product, for example, will usually have greater access to
information concerning the contemplated suspension or denial
of an export license, but a foreign importer may have equal or
even greater access to such information. Foreign buyers often
have had prior dealings with authorities at the place of exporta-
tion and sometimes have agents or brokers who operate within
that locale.24 In such a case, courts may properly adjust the
performance responsibility of the parties in accordance with
their respective abilities to foresee and avert the risk of loss. In
this way, the pronisor will not be deemed to be exclusively re-
sponsible for managing the risk of nonperformance; rather,
management responsibilities will be shared.125
The prior occurrence of a particular risk also should not be
122. Professor Farnsworth provides this useful analogy:
[Parties] give their 'imited attention" only to a limited number of sit-
uations which they choose by some initial process of selection. An apt
analogy is that of the guest at the cocktail party who chooses to listen
to a limited number of others selected from the general hubbub of
conversation. These situations about which a party forms his expecta-
tions will here be called "significant situations" for the parties.
Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 869. Farnsworth adds, "disputes over omissions
arise both from the absence of expectation and from the understatement of ex-
pectation." Id. at 871.
123. 363 F.2d at 318.
124. This is especially so in preshipment and, to a lesser extent, in ship-
ment contracts. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADXMRALTY § 3-34,
at 142-44 (2d ed. 1975); 5 D. SASSOON, BRrrisH SHIPPING LAWS C.I.F. AND
F.O.B. CONTRACTS 330 (3d ed. 1978); C. SCHMiTrHOFF, SCHmfrTHOFF'S Ex.
PORT TRADE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 153-82 (7th
ed. 1980); cf. U.C.C. §§ 2-310, 2-319, 2-321.
125. This proposition reflects only a partial qualification of the "presump-
tion" underlying the general principle that promisors should be responsible for
managing their own risks. In sharing the loss, both parties in effect are joint
risk managers.
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sufficient by itself to charge a party with knowledge of the re-
currence of that risk or its severity. The fact that spiralling in-
flation has occurred in the past does not by itself suggest that
either party should be able to anticipate future periods of infla-
tion or the severity of inflation if it does recur. A prior disrup-
tion indicates only that one or both parties conceivably could
have anticipated that a similar disruption might intervene and
might hinder performance to an unspecified extent at some fu-
ture date. Responsibility for the cost of such a devastation
should not necessarily flow from hindsight. Moreover, a con-
tractor may foresee a risk and yet be powerless to "control"
either its occurrence or its harmful effects. Indeed, both par-
ties may foresee the risk of loss and have an equal opportunity
to insure against its occurrence. In each case, foresight is not
determinative of the ability to control and must not be permit-
ted to prescribe the relative performance responsibilities of the
parties.
The use of a "contemplation test" for determining control
is derived from the notion that anticipation of a performance
risk may, but need not, indicate that a party is reasonably able
to control that risk. It also involves a relative inquiry by courts
into what the parties actually did contemplate. Contractors
may anticipate that certain risks are more or less "likely" to oc-
cur. They may also view particular performance losses as more
or less "probable." Thus, each party's performance responsibil-
ity is likely to increase in proportion to its contemplation of the
risk of harm. The greater a contractor's foresight, the greater
is the probability that it will assume a larger proportion of re-
sponsibility for the resulting loss.126 Where both parties are
found to have contemplated the risk and ensuing harm, the
contemplation test permits courts to charge both parties with a
duty to exercise reasonable control over that performance risk.
The court may then allocate the loss in proportion to the par-
ties' relative ability to control the risk.127
126. See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283.
293-94 (7th Cir. 1974); Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp.,
365 Mass. 122, 129-30, 310 N.E.2d 363, 367-68 (1974); see also Iowa Elec. Light &
Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129, 135 (1978), rev'd on other grounds.
603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980); Nora Springs
Cooperative Co. v. Brandau, 247 N.W.2d 744, 747-48 (Iowa 1976).
127. For example, in Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F.
Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980), the court found that both parties "had every reason
to predict that the likely range of variation [in the objective price index] would
not exceed three cents per pound [of aluminum] .... Both consciously un-
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The contemplation test does introduce difficulties in estab-
lishing the extent to which the parties were aware of the risk
at the time of contracting. 28 This is not a serious obstacle,
however, so long as the test is confined by an objective standard
of probable awareness. Courts may properly focus on what the
parties did contemplate or reasonably should have contem-
plated at the time of contracting in determining the proportion
of the loss each party should be held to have actually assumed.
The contemplation test, as a means by which courts can de-
fine a party's "reasonable control" over performance risks and
ensuing losses, is, however, incomplete. Courts should also in-
clude within the meaning of control the ability of each party to
avert or mitigate the harmful effects of the risk on perform-
ance. A "mitigation test" would require that a party who was
abe 'to avert or mitigate the effects of a performance risk be
held to have had control over that risk. It requires courts to
identify the party who was better able to ascertain the nature
of an intervening risk, to determine its probability of occur-
rence, and to appreciate its likely effect on performance. In ad-
dition, courts should determine which party was better able to
avoid the consequences of the risk, through what means, and at
what cost. Under the mitigation standard, a party thus is re-
sponsible for failing to take reasonable precautions to prevent a
risk from materializing into a performance loss.29 A seller, for
example, may be held responsible for failing to seek additional
or alternative sources of supply in the event of a production
shortfall or for failing to arrange for a modified means of deliv-
ery in the face of transportation impediments.130 On the other
dertook a closely calculated risk rather than a limitless one." r& at 70. The
parties ultimately shared the loss.
128. Courts have attempted to determine what the parties reasonably could
have foreseen. In Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352
N.Y.S.2d 784 (1974), for example, the court remarkech "We can reasonably as-
sume that the plaintiff had to be aware of escalating inflation. It is chargeable
with knowledge of the substantial increase of the price of raw milk from the
previous year's low." I at 1085, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 790 (emphasis added); see also
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
129. The duty to take precautions is a part of the continuing duty of coop-
eration that each party must fulfill in ongoing relationships. This is especially
necessary when the parties are separated from one another by space and cir-
cumstance or when one party is better equipped than its trade partner to avoid
disruptions in performance. See infra text accompanying notes 133-36.
130. Courts often have held that sellers who do not secure alternative sup-
plies in the face of supply shortages are responsible for failing to exercise con-
trol over the risk of loss. For example, in Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v.
Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932), the court refused to
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hand, the buyer may be held responsible for failing to warn the
seller of a performance obstacle known to the buyer that might
undermine the buyer's performance. Thus, both parties may be
responsible under this test. The promisor, although better able
than the promisee to ascertain the nature and effect of an in-
tervening performance risk, may not be better able than the
promisee to avoid the harmful consequences of that risk. In
such a case, the parties would share the loss in proportion to
their relative capacities to avert both the risk and the harm.
The duty to exercise reasonable precautions in perform-
ance is especially evident in the energy cases. In Iowa Electric
Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp.,131 for example, the district
court refused to excuse Atlas from its obligations under its
long-term, fixed-price contract to supply uranium. Finding that
Atlas "was in the best position to protect itself from the vagar-
ies of the marketplace and [was] obviously at least as able to
bear the risk" as was the plaintiff, the court held Atlas fully li-
able for its nonperformance.32
The presumption that suppliers assume the full risk of
nonperformance would be rebutted by a showing that the
promisee-purchaser was able to exercise some degree of "con-
trol" over the particular risk. Purchasers have "control" over a
risk when they have special knowledge concerning the likeli-
hood of producer-induced cutbacks in supply, are aware that
suppliers have no equivalent knowledge, and nevertheless fail
to notify their suppliers of such cutbacks.
Under the general principle thus formulated, a party as-
sumes responsibility for that proportion of risks and losses
within its control. Each party's ability to control performance
excuse a molasses supplier from performing because "[t]here [was] nothing to
show that the defendant [supplier] would have been unable by a timely con-
tract with the [molasses] refinery to have assured itself of a supply sufficient
for its needs." Id. at 199, 179 N.E. at 384. Similarly in Luria Bros. & Co. v.
Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal Inc., 600 F.2d 103, 110-12 (7th Cir. 1979), a sup-
plier was held liable for failing to perform when his source of supply failed
because he had not limited himself by contract to supply scrap from a single
source and had failed to establish that substitute scrap was not available. See
also Center Garment Co. v. United Refrigerator Co., 369 Mass. 633, 636, 341
N.E.2d 669, 672 (1975) (seller should have obtained a "backup supplier");
Frank B. Bozzo, Inc. v. Electric Weld Div., Inc., 283 Pa. Super. 35, 42, 423 A.2d
702, 707-08 (1980) (defendant-supplier not entitled to jury instruction regarding
commercial impracticability because defendant could have stockpiled supplies
in order to ensure performance).
131. 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d
1301 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 911 (1980).
132. Id. at 140.
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is an important component in risk management. Thus, a failure
to cooperate in facilitating performance may increase the liabil-
ity of the risk manager. To avoid this unnecessary increase in
liability, contractors should provide their trade partners with
reasonable notice or any other assistance necessary to fulfill
their respective performance obligations.133 Those engaged in
extended relationships are frequently able, and indeed ex-
pected, to provide notice of their inability to perform according
to the terms of the agreement.3 4 Such parties are also ex-
pected to give notice of their need to alter the nature and con-
tent of their performance in order to fulfill preexisting
obligations.35 For instance, under section 2-615(c) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, "[t]he seller must notify the buyer sea-
sonably that there will be delay or non-delivery ... ."136
Similarly, a party who is in a position to provide a trade partner
with information concerning intervening hazards that might
disrupt the other's performance is under a "duty to cooperate"
during the course of performance. In Canadian Industrial Al-
cohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co.,137 a molasses supplier claimed
that it was unable to make full delivery because the refinery
that produced the- molasses had reduced its production. The
court stated that "[i]f the plaintiff had been so informed [of the
reduction in supplies], it would very likely have preferred to
deal with the refinery directly."38 The supplier, therefore, by
not giving the purchaser notice of impediments to supply, con-
133. The obligation to "cooperate" during the course of contracting is well-
established in both civil and common law systems. Culpa in contrahendo, or
fault in negotiating, is a well-developed precept of German law. See Kessler &
Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Con-
tract. A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REV. 401, 401-09 (1964). Comnenta-
tors have urged that the significance and operation of 'bad faith" in
performance be carefully scrutinized by courts. See, e.g., Burton, Breach of
Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv. L
REV. 369, 394-402 (1980); Eisenberg, Good Faith Under The Uniform Commer-
cial Code-A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 14-18 (1971);
Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 676-78 (1963); Hillman,
supra note 68, at 876-901; Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law
and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195,
252-62 (1968).
134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 133.
136. U.C.C. § 2-615(c); see also Bunge Corp. v. Miller, 381 F. Supp. 176, 180
(W.D. Tenn. 1974) (notification some three months after date of performance
of inability to deliver not "seasonable").
137. 258 N.Y. 194, 179 N.E. 383 (1932).
138. IX. at 199, 179 N.E. at 384.
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ceivably had prevented the purchaser from obtaining molasses
by alternative means.
In order to promote interparty settlement of impracticabil-
ity suits, courts should also require that each party demonstrate
its good faith in attempting to settle. Those parties who fail to
exercise good faith should assume additional responsibility for
the loss. The concepts of "good faith" and "bad faith" are ren-
dered more objective when premised on reliable evidence of a
party's conduct in a given situation. Bad faith conduct may be
evidenced, for example, by a party's unreasonable refusal to
participate in the settlement process established by the court,
by its attempts to impose unrealistic demands on a cocontrac-
tor, or by its refusal to comply with the terms of the settlement
agreed to by the parties. On the other hand, when a party can
establish to the satisfaction of the court that equitable settle-
ment could not be attained despite its conscientious efforts, the
court may find that the party acted in good faith even though it
refused to settle. This may occur when a cocontractor is in an
inherently superior bargaining position and is likely to employ
that superior position to gain unfair advantage. Given the pro-
vision for judicial supervision of interparty settlement through
the appointment of a special master or by recourse to a final of-
fer procedure, however, there would be few cases in which a
party reasonably could decline to settle consistent with the re-
quirement of good faith. Where a party has evidenced bad faith
in settling, the court may properly adjust the apportionment of
loss in response to that bad faith.
The system of allocating performance losses should also re-
flect a policy in favor of minimizing public harm measured by
the extent of diminished efficiency sustained by the economy as
a whole.139 For example, the court may increase the buyer's
proportionate share of the loss if it finds that the imposition of
an unmodified loss upon the supplier would lead to significant
unemployment in the supplier's workforce, result in the gen-
139. This is undoubtedly a difficult task. How is the court to measure the
individual harm sustained by the promisor and the promisee? Even more
problematic, how is the judge to delineate the ambit of a public loss? The an-
swer will frequently require an interdisciplinary analysis: courts must identify
in both quantitative and qualitative terms the nature and extent of social and
economic interests that are most closely connected to the promisor's perform-
ance. The court may perhaps consult with market analysts to assist it in iden-
tifying interest groups that are directly or indirectly dependent upon the
promisor. The court also may evaluate the availability of substitute employ-
ment for the promisor's employees, and it may consider the promisor's custom-
ers and their ability to acquire substitute goods at reasonable costs.
[Vol. 69:471
COMMERCML IMPRACTICABILITY
eral underemployment of capital resources, or decrease the
availability of a scarce, staple product in the marketplace. This
judicial adjustment of losses, however, should only be adopted
in the presence of clear evidence of socioeconomic harm. It
should not be employed to increase disproportionately the eco-
nomic burden that must be borne by the buyer and the commu-
nity of interests that depend on that buyer. The increase in
cost of a good or service does not, in and of itself, evidence suf-
ficient public injury to justify shifting the economic loss from
the seller to the buyer in all cases. Such increments in cost are
purely quantitative measures; they do not establish accurately
the quality of socioeconomic harm suffered by either the par-
ties themselves or by the community of interests that depend
on the agreement between those parties. Similarly, public
harm does not necessarily arise merely because a promisor
would be rendered insolvent if compelled to perform.140
Rather, the judicial readjustment of losses should depend on
whether compelling the seller to perform would lead to a large
reservoir of unchannelled capital or labor or to the depletion of
a valued product in the marketplace.
Judicial adjustment is especially useful in cases involving
long-term supply and installment sales contracts when the con-
tinued association between the parties may have broad social
and economic implications.141 Interdependent relationships in-
volving enormous quasi-public organizations, like that between
Westinghouse and its customers, arguably must be encouraged
in order to maintain the supply of goods and services essential
to industrial growth. The public interest in the continued per-
formance of such contracts may warrant increasing the custom-
ers' share of the loss, even though their "control" over the risk
of loss is limited by the "contemplation" and "mitigation" tests
under the general principle outlined above.
In calculating each party's proportionate share of the loss,
courts also should consider the "transactional" or "relational"
nature of the agreement, the source of interparty conflict, and
the possible effects that a judicial allocation of loss likely would
have on future relations between the parties. Because contracts
vary in their nature, content, and purpose, no one, all-encom-
140. Insolvency traditionally has been described as an example of "subjec-
tive impossibility." Unlike "objective impossibility," however, "subjective im-
possibility" has not been recognized as an excuse from performance. See supra
note 6.
141. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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passing rule can regulate every agreement adequately.142 Con-
tractors have differing degrees of "control" over risks; each
may have a unique ability to contemplate risks and to avert the
harmful consequences that stem from those risks. Moreover,
the degree of socioeconomic harm caused by a performance loss
will vary according to the duration and significance of the en-
terprise involved.143 Each case ultimately requires evaluation
on its own merits in accordance with the principles formulated
above. The judicial construction of the concepts of bad faith, in-
dividual hardship, and public harm of course will necessitate
normative value choices. As long as their normative character-
istics are identified and evaluated in the context of each dis-
pute, however, such concepts can be employed usefully in the
allocation of performance losses.
CONCLUSION
A regime of legal remedies ideally should be integrated
into the fundamental principles of substantive law. The need
for a functional category of remedial adjustments, however, be-
comes more pressing when an all-or-nothing principle of law
governs nonperformance and produces neither fairness nor eco-
nomic efficiency. The proposed regime of remedies for loss ad-
justment is intended not only as a means to enhance
socioeconomic utility, but also as a tool to implement the equi-
table notion that nonperforming parties should not always be
142. Professor Corbin once stated:
We can not lay down one simple and all-controlling rule for these var-
ious kinds of frustration and impossibility. Many varying factors must
be considered in each case that arises .... The problem is that of al-
locating, in the most generally satisfactory way, the risks of harm and
disappointment that result from supervening events.
6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1322, at 327 (1962).
143. For example, in many long-term supply contracts, courts may prop-
erly increase the purchaser's proportionate share of performance losses,
notwithstanding the supplier's apparent "control" over the risk of loss, if the
purchaser anticipated the performance disruption, if it possibly could have
taken precautions to avoid the risk of loss, or, most importantly, if imposing
the entire performance loss upon the supplier would run contrary to the inter-
ests of a commodity-dependent public. In contrast, in many diverse transac-
tions the purchaser may be unable to anticipate and avoid intervening risks
because of its lack of prior dealings with the supplier or its inexperience in in-
dustry. Similarly, there is less likelihood of community hardship in discrete
transactions because the public is generally less dependent on short-term, ter-
minal transactions than it is on more extended and ongoing relationships. See
supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
(Vol. 69:471
COMMERCIAL IMPRACTICABILITY
held liable for all losses arising from commercially impractica-
ble transactions.
When a party to a commercial agreement alleges that per-
formance has become commercially impracticable, a court
should consider first whether to divide performance losses be-
tween the parties as an alternative to the grant or denial of an
absolute excuse from nonperformance. If the court determines
that loss sharing is appropriate, and if the court believes that
the contractors themselves are better able than the court to de-
termine the scope of their settlement by their own means, it
should encourage the parties to reach an interim settlement. If,
however, the court determines that the parties are unlikely to
reach an agreement in good faith, the court may require each
party to present a "final offer" of contribution toward the loss
and select the contribution figure of the preferred party. When
a court concludes that neither interim settlement nor a final of-
fer procedure is appropriate, it should allocate performance
losses between the parties itself. The court-imposed allocation
should vary in accordance with the capacity of each party to ex-
ercise control over the risk of loss.
This regime of judicial loss-sharing remedies depends on
the courts' independent assessment of the facts of each case and
on the ability of each court to divide fairly performance losses
between the parties. Implicit in the judicial assessment is the
need to reconcile the ex post principle embodied in the judicial
allocation of loss with the ex ante principle whereby parties
themselves assume the risks they are better able than their co-
contractors to control. This ex post reconciliation requires the
modification of the ex ante principle in the face of substanti-
ated evidence of unfairness to one party or undue public harm.
Judicial discretion, thus, is a necessary part of the loss-sharing
regime. The value of such discretion, however, lies in its rea-
soned confinement.
1985]

